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ABSTRACT





M.A., SHIH HSIN UNIVERSITY
M.A., NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald Epstein
The Great Recession and the revival attention on inequality have cast doubts
on various aspects of the governance of Corporate America. Not only the specific
design of corporate governance institutions, but also the very purpose of the firm
have became hotly debated issues.
The first essay investigates the effect of the CEO’s equity-based pay on workers’
wages and whether the effect is amplified by product market competition. Since
the 1980s, Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) pay has exploded, largely in the form
of equity-based incentive compensation such as stock awards and options. Using a
two-tiered principal-agent model, we show that aligning managers’ incentives with
shareholder interests through equity-based pay can lower workers’ wages. Analyzing
a sample that matches firm, manager, and worker information in the U.S. economy
vi
over the period 1992-2016, we show that higher equity-based pay is associated with
lower average wages across various measures of pay and model settings. Using a novel
instrumental-variable strategy based on a tax policy change, we provide evidence that
an increase in the CEO equity-to-salary ratio by one unit, say, from 1:1 to 2:1, leads
to a 4% decline in the average wage. We also find that while firms under all degrees of
competition raise equity pay in response to the policy change, the negative impact on
wages is stronger when the degree of competition is high, suggesting that competition
does not substitute for executive compensation but amplifies its effect.
The second essay analyzes the effect of CEOs’ equity-based pays on firms’ invest-
ment herding. Firms, like individual investors, may herd on investments resulting in
the co-movement in firms’ and the industry’s investments. Will the CEO’s equity-
based compensation increase or decrease the investment herding? Economic theories
disagree. The information-based theory suggests that more equity-based pay can
reduce managers’ herd behaviors, while the compensation-based theory argues the
opposite. This paper provides a rare opportunity to examine the conflicting pre-
dictions of two major theories. Applying a novel instrumental-variable strategy to
analyze a CEO-firm matched sample of the U.S. firms over the period 1992-2016,
we find that an increase in the CEO’s equity-to-salary ratio leads to a decrease in
investment herding.
The third essay discusses the role of the labor-affiliated shareholder in the reform of
the purpose of the firm. Shareholder primacy may help to halt corporate misconduct
when shareholders have pro-social preferences and concern about externalities. A
shareholder democracy in which ethical shareholders push the manager to maximize
shareholders’ welfare rather than wealth can lead to better social outcomes. However,
my analyses show that, given the heterogeneity among shareholders and realistic
institutional conditions, the balance still tilts heavily toward profit maximization
such that ethical shareholders will become extinct and good social outcomes are not
vii
sustainable without the participation of union and public pension funds. This is
consistent with the evidence that most social proposals have been coming from labor-
affiliated shareholders, implying that a shareholder democracy cannot sustain itself
without the involvement of stakeholders or the “special interest” shareholders that
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CHAPTER 1
DO INCENTIVIZED MANAGERS PAY THEIR
WORKERS LESS?
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The equity-based compensation structure
Since the 1980s, as the wages of most workers have stagnated in the U.S., Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) pay has exploded, largely in the form of equity-based in-
centive compensation such as stock awards and options. Although the change in the
CEO’s compensation structure and the CEO-worker income gap have attracted a lot
of attention, the literature usually analyzes the causes of patterns of CEO compen-
sation and workers’ wages separately; while the increase of CEO’s compensation is
attributed to the competition for talent, managerial rent-seeking, tax policies and the
need to provide incentives for managers’ efforts under shareholders’ pressures,1 the
stagnation of workers’ wages is attributed to technological changes, globalization, de-
clining union density, etc. A critical issue has been largely omitted: does the change
in CEOs’ compensation structures make workers’ wages stagnate or decline? Specif-
ically, do CEOs’ stock-based pay, which have been the biggest part in the CEO’s
compensation package since the 1980s, induce managers to cut workers’ wages?
The omission of empirical study on this issue is conspicuous against the theoretical
literature. Focusing on the conflicting incentives of “principals” (shareholders) and
their “agents” (managers), agency theory, which has been the major framework in
1See, for example, Piketty & Saez (2003), Burkhauser, et al. (2012), and Bakija, Cole & Heim
(2012) for the US case, and Bell & Van Reenen (2013) for the UK case.
1
the literature,2 claims that stock-based compensation helps to align the interests
of shareholders and managers, such that managers are less likely to take the “easy
road”, paying high wages as a comfortable way of minimizing conflicts; their energetic
pursuit of self-interest motivates them to cut wage costs and increase firm efficiency
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Pagano & Volpin, 2005).3 In
spite of the plausible prediction, which we formalize in a simple model in Section 1.2,
so far there is no empirical study on the effect of managerial incentive compensation
structure on workers wages in the U.S. economy.
To fill the gap, this paper investigates the following question: Does equity-based
compensation incentivize managers to pay workers less? We first develop a simple
two-tier principal-agent model to show that because profit and therefore stock price
are influenced by the manager’s choice of monitor level, as long as the equity ratio is
high enough, the equity income may be sufficient to offset the cost of giving up the
peaceful life, such that the manager is willing to exercise high monitoring and reduce
workers’ wages.
Next, we implement a set of analyses and a novel instrumental-variable strategy
using a tax policy change, finding that a higher equity-based pay, measured by Eq-
uity Fraction (equity-based pay divided by the total compensation) or Equity Ratio
(equity-based pay divided by salary), consistently associates with lower wages. The
effect persists even when the equity-based pay is decomposed into stock awards and
2See Shleifer & Vishny (1997), Murphy (2013), and Edmans, et al. (2017b) for reviews of the
literature.
3Although a detailed analysis of the theoretical debates around the determinants of CEO com-
pensation is beyond the scope of the present study, it’s interesting to mention that a variant of
agency theory, managerial rent-seeking theory (Bebchuk and Fried 2006), is based on the same
principal-agent framework and shareholder primacy, but argues that excessive stock-based pay is
actually a result of managerial power, allowing managers to maximize their own interests at the
expense of shareholder value. This theory proposes a better-designed incentive compensation and a
stronger shareholder activism to discipline managers. Following this logic, however, we are not sure
whether a rent-seeking manager under stock-based compensation has an incentive to reduce wages
or not. The proponents of the theory have been silent on this issue.
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stock options, and also when being combined into the performance pay as a whole.
Evidence from our IV estimation suggests that an one-unit increase in the CEO’s
equity-to-salary ratio, say, from 1:1 to 2:1, will lead to a 4% reduction in the average
wage. In addition to this baseline result, we further show that this negative effect
is more significant when the degree of competition is high than low, implying that
competition does not substitute compensation, but amplifies its effect by enlarging
the gap between rewards under different profit outcomes.
A major advance of this paper is the identification strategy based on a tax policy
change. The motivation of this effort is to identify causality beyond correlation,
since several omitted factors might affect both managers’ compensation structures
and workers’ wages and make them correlated. For example, a technology change
may affect the dynamics of both workers’ and managers’ labor markets, such that the
firm can reduce ordinary workers’ wages while needing to provide more incentives to
attract talented managers. Alternatively, a firm with a worrisome business outlook
may pay workers less, and yet at the same time try to adopt new strategies by giving
managers more equity incentives. This paper addresses the issue by utilizing a change
in the corporate-tax deductibility of CEO’s salary brought by Section 162(m) of
Internal Revenue Code in 1993. Under this legislation, non-performance pay, mainly
salaries, paid to top-five managers above $1 million will be subjected to a 60% federal
surtax. As a consequence, firms switch to forms of performance pay, especially equity-
based ones, to compensate their managers while keeping salaries at or below the
$1 million threshold. We use whether the CEO’s salary falls into the treatment
range around (and above) the threshold, and the amount of salary, as instruments
for changes in the CEO compensation structure measured by the equity-based-pay-
to-salary ratio. While this legislation and its effects on CEO compensation structures
had been studied by many, this paper is the first to transform it into an instrument
and identify the causal effects of compensation structure on firm outcomes.
3
An important obstacle to any study on this issue in the U.S. economy is the lack
of micro-data that links the information of CEO compensation, firm characteristics
and workers’ wages precisely.4 To alleviate the obstacle, we focus on the average
wage of individual firm, and construct a firm-level sample by matching firms’ av-
erage wages and other information (source: Compustat) with CEOs’ compensation
structure (source: Execucomp). We then link the data with workers’ characteristics
calculated as the weighted averages at the 2-digit industry level (sources: Current
Population Survey (CPS)). This results in a firm-level panel data set of the U.S.
economy covering the period 1992-2016, with variables of worker characteristics mea-
sured at the industry level.5 Supplementing to our baseline analyses, we also use other
data in a set of robustness tests (Section 1.3.3) to address several potential concerns,
including the low report rate of wage information in Compustat, composition changes
due to offshoring, heterogeneity between non-financial and financial sectors, and the
industry-year-specific shocks.
1.1.2 Related literature and contributions of the paper
By showing that equity-based pay does induce managers to reduce workers’ wages
in the U.S., this paper makes several contributions to the following literature. First,
this paper is the first to study this question in the U.S. economy. To the best of our
4Most linked employer-employee data sets are merged at the establishment level using identifiers
such as Employer Identification Number (EIN). But a firm may have multiple establishments at
various levels and use multiple EINs for different purposes. To the best of our knowledge, there is
yet no simple way to find all establishments for a given firm and merge the establishment-level data
with firm’s balance sheet and CEO compensation data (Handwerker & Mason, 2013; 2014).
5This approach of sample building is similar to many studies utilizing heterogeneities across
industries and using industry-level variables as their main explanatory variables and individual
variables as outcomes, such as the literature on inter-industry wage structure since Krueger &
Summers (1988). Other examples include: Leonardi (2007) link individual data from CPS to firm
data from Compustat at the industry level, to study the effects of industrial capital-labor ratio
(capital per employee) on individual wage dispersion; Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) match firm
data from Compustat with individual data from tax reports at the industry level, to study the
effects of increasing dependence on financial income at the industry level on earnings dispersion
among individual workers.
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knowledge, this issue had been addressed only partially by Cronqvist et al. (2009) for
the Swedish economy.6 In their analysis of Swedish data over the period 1995-2002,
they find that while CEOs with more voting rights pay their workers more, CEOs’
financial incentives (cash-flow rights, measured by the fraction of firm’s shares owned
by the CEO) mitigate such effects, putting downward pressures on workers’ wages.
While their results are generally in line with ours, however, in an one-share-one-vote
system that is common in the U.S., a high managerial shareholding implies both
strong controlling power and strong financial incentives, which are predicted to have
conflicting effects on wages. This may cause ambiguities and hinder interpretations if
we apply their measurement to the U.S. case. Instead, this paper uses Equity Fraction
and Equity Ratio as the main explanatory variables to avoid the problem. In our anal-
yses, the negative effects of Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio on wages persist after
controlling for managerial shareholdings.7 Moving beyond their analyses, we further
examine the effects of various parts of executive compensation in detail, including
stock award, stock option, performance pay as a whole, and non-equity performance
pay, and our examination include other high-ranking managers’ compensations as
well.
Second, due to the complexity in the process of determining executive compen-
sation, the empirical literature on the effects of executive compensation had been
experiencing difficulty in identifying causality, and just starts to overcome it in few
recent studies.8 This paper joins in the recent trend to focus on the causal effect
6In the broader literature of corporate governance, for the U.S. economy, Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan (1999; 2003) provide evidence over the period 1976-1995 showing that firms that face
lower takeover threats due to anti-takeover legislation (and therefore managers are more entrenched)
tend to pay their workers higher wages. Unfortunately they didn’t take into account the effects of
managers’ compensations.
7Please see the results in Section 1.3.3.2.
8See Edmans, et al. (2017b) for a review of empirical literature on the effects of executive
compensations.
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of executive compensation structure on wages, using a novel identification strategy
based on the IRC 162(m).
Third, a literature argues that changes in corporate governance do not matter in
competitive industries, because competition substitutes for governance and always
pushes toward managers efficiency. This thesis is supported by Giroud & Mueller
(2010), in which they find that changes in the anti-takeover regulation have no effect
on firms’ performances when competition is strong. However, we find a completely
reversed pattern: the negative impact of CEO equity pay is stronger when competi-
tion is strong, suggesting that competition enlarges the gap between rewards under
different outcomes and does not substitute the effect of compensation but amplifies
it.
Fourth, starting from Jensen & Meckling (1976), most theoretical literature on
incentive compensation focus on the managerial shareholding in the one-tier principal-
agent relationship between shareholders and managers.9 We argue that the effect
of managerial shareholding on wages is ambiguous, and focus on the compensation
structure which connects closely to our empirical analyses. In addition, in our two-tier
principal-agent model, we analyze the effect of compensation structure change using
a multiplicative specification similar to Edmans, Gabaix & Landier (2008), rather
than the additive one typical in the literature, of CEO utility.
Fifth, in recent years, the increasing skepticism of equity-based pay, and of share-
holder primacy in general, have on other detrimental consequences: excessive risk-
taking (Coles, et al., 2006; Chen, et al., 2006; Pathan, 2009; Bolton, et al., 2015),
increased stock buybacks at the expense of real investment and employment (Lazon-
ick, 2014; Almeida, et al., 2016; Edmans, et al., 2017a; Gutiérrez & Philippon, 2016),
massive layoffs and outsourcing (Jung, 2015 & 2016; Dial & Murphy, 1995). This
9The collusion model literature (Tirole, 1986; Pagano & Volpin, 2005) developed two-tier
principal-agent models, but did not move beyond the focus of managerial shareholding.
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paper contributes to this literature by providing the first evidence for the negative
effects of the incentive compensation on wages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops a simple two-
tiered principal-agent model to clarify the main argument and prediction. Section
1.3 describes the data and methods, presents our baseline results, and reports results
from a set of robustness tests. Section 1.4 explains the institutional background
and the construct of instrument, and presents evidence for causality based on the
IV estimation. Section 1.5 looks closer at the effects of market competition on the
relationship between the CEO’s equity pay and workers’ wages. Section 1.6 concludes.
Details of data sources, variable measurements, and the results of robustness tests are
reported in the Appendices.
1.2 A simple model of the effect of equity-based compensa-
tion structure on wages
1.2.1 The argument and key features
The main argument of the model is that by increasing equity-based pay, measured
by Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio, the manager will be incentivized to reduce work-
ers’ wages. In putting forward a tractable prediction, this section develops a simple
two-tier principal-agent model that first, specifies the manager’s incentives and the
interactions between the manager and the worker; and second, derives the measures
of compensation structures and analyzes the effects of changes in compensation struc-
tures on wages.
Three features distinguish the model from the literature. First, in analyzing the
interaction between the manager and the worker, this paper adopts a collusion model
following Tirole (1986) in which agents can make monetary or non-monetary side pay-
7
ments, i.e., private benefits.10 However, most collusion models start from analyzing
the factors determining compensation, and aim to design an optimal contract from
the principal’s perspective. In contrast, this paper focuses on the consequence of the
CEO’s compensation structure, rather than the causes of it. In addition, as Tirole
(1986) had also warned that the model itself does not suggest whether the exchanges
among agents are welfare-enhancing (cooperation) or not (collusion), a discussion of
the welfare outcome requires a comprehensive general equilibrium model and a cost-
benefit analysis which go beyond the scope of this paper. This paper takes a more
neutral and moderate view, abstracting from the optimality question11 and focusing
on the empirical prediction to facilitate the empirical analysis.
The second feature of the model is the focus on the manager’s compensation
structure, rather than his shareholding of the firm. The later has been the main
measure of executive incentives in the literature. For example, in Pagano & Volpin
(2005), which develops a model closest to mine, worker’s wages will be lower if the
manager’s shareholding is higher. An important reason for their focus on shareholding
is to analyze the conflict between the shareholder and the manager in controlling the
firm, which is also the typical concern of agency theory. In contrast, this paper
deviates from the overwhelming concern of shareholder interest and the shareholder-
manager conflict. In addition, the shareholding measure may be inappropriate for
our empirical study, as it conflates controlling power and financial incentive in the
one-share-one-vote system, as explained in Section 1.2.
10The side payment (private benefit) and its effect on wages have been studied previously in the
context of (anti-)takeover strategy used by the incumbent manager (Shleifer & Summers (1988);
Pagano & Volpin (2005); Bertrand & Mullainathan (1999; 2003)). In contrast to the (anti-)takeover
literature, in the model we abstract from the question of control, i.e., the power conflict between the
shareholder and the manager in controlling the firm.
11Therefore, for example, the simple model in this section does not explicitly specify the share-
holder’s utility function. The model also abstracts from some typical focuses of the literature on
optimal compensation design like the uncertainty in measuring the manager’s effort.
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The third feature of the model is a multiplicative specification of CEO utility,
rather than the additive one typical in the literature. With multiplicative preferences,
the utility from private benefit is proportional to the CEO’s total compensation,
and influences naturally the fraction of equity-based pay needed to incentivize the
manager to cut wages. This specification is used in the macroeconomics literature on
labor supply choice, and is introduced into an analysis of CEO incentives by Edmans,
Gabaix & Landier (2008).
1.2.2 The model
The scenario of the model goes as follows. In a simple model of labor extraction
and collusion, the worker chooses the level of effort, and whether to give the manager
a side payment or not, depending on the level of monitoring chosen by the manager.
The manager chooses the level of monitoring, which relates directly to the worker’s
wage level, accounting for the worker’s behaviors and the incentive compensation
structure designed by the shareholder. With the incidence of side payment depends
on the level of monitoring, the manager therefore faces a trade-off between the private
benefit from the side payment, and the value of the incremental reward brought by
the choice of a higher level of monitoring and regulated by the amount of equity
in his compensation package. The compensation structure measures how much the
equity-based pay is needed for the manager to offset the loss of private benefit. The
model shows that with more equity-based pay, measured by Equity Fraction and
Equity Ratio, the manager will more likely give up the private benefit and choose a
higher level of monitoring, resulting in a lower wage for the worker.
The presentation of the model proceeds in three steps. First, we solve the la-
bor extraction game to derive the wage function, and then specify the relation of
the wage/monitoring to the firm’s surplus and stock price. Second, we specify the
payoff and utility functions of the manager, and analyze his utility maximization by
9
incorporating the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints, which natu-
rally relate to a threshold of equity-based compensation structure needed for inducing
high monitoring. Finally, we analyze the possible choice of compensation structure
by shareholders and its effect on workers’ wages, and explain the connection between
two measures, Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio, that will be used in the following
empirical analyses.
1.2.2.1 Wage setting, the firm’s surplus, and stock price
In a simple model of labor extraction/monitoring, the worker can choose con-
tributing effort or not. If the worker contributes effort, his utility is w − c, and
mw̄ + (1 −m)w otherwise, where w is the wage, w̄ is the reservation wage, c is the
cost of effort, m reflects the strength or probability of monitoring. Therefore, the
worker’s incentive compatibility constraint is:
m(w − w̄) ≥ c, (1.1)
and the wage eliciting the worker’s effort is




There are two levels of output, yH and yL, corresponding to the worker’s effort
and no effort. Assume yH−yL > cm , i.e., the increase in output is bigger than the cost
of eliciting effort by the wage, such that the manager and the shareholder will always
want to elicit effort. In this case, it is always the case that w = w̄+ c
m
, and the worker
always put effort and produce yH , while the manager can choose different levels of m
and pay different levels of w. Here we assume no link between monitor and outputs.
This should be treated as a conservative, “lower-bound” scenario, because should
a higher monitor level give rise to higher outputs and therefore higher profits, the
10
manager’s opportunity cost of having a peaceful life will be higher, and the manager
would be more hostile at all levels of equity ratio. For simplicity and focusing on the
effect on the average wage, we also assume the manager’s choices do not affect the
number of workers and normalize the number to one.
As we focus on the works of the manager and the worker, and abstract from other
production factors, the firm’s surplus, Π, is determined as
Π = yH − w − s, (1.3)
where s is the fixed salary for the manager. Specifically, denote ΠH and ΠL as the
surpluses produced when the manager chooses high and low levels of monitoring
respectively such that
 ΠL = yH − (w̄ +
c
mL
)− s if m = mL;
ΠH = yH − (w̄ + cmH )− s if m = mH .
Market then evaluates the firm’s surplus and projects onto a market price of the firm’s
stock as
p = p(Π(m)). (1.4)
For simplicity, we ignore here the complex and often imperfect process of stock market
evaluation, and assume that market can identify the effect of a manager’s action in the
sense that the function is monotonically increasing with Π. Without loss of generality,
the gap between pL and pH , which correspond to ΠL and ΠH , can be simplified as
pL = pH(1− λ), (1.5)
where 0 < λ < 1. With this simple representation, the change in the firm’s stock
price is regulated by λ, which is an indicator of price-to-surplus sensitivity created
11
by the manager’s monitoring. The more effective is the monitoring, the larger the
indicator, and therefore the larger difference between pL and pH .
12 The value of the
equity-based pay is therefore regulated directly by the market evaluation of firm’s
stocks which is linked with the manager’s monitoring. While the manager can choose
between high and low levels of monitoring, the consequences of his choice to the firm’s
surplus and stock price are public knowledge and known beforehand.13
1.2.2.2 The manager’s payoff and utility maximization
The total compensation of the manager, G, consists of two components, a fixed
salary and an equity-based pay that relates to the market evaluation of firm’s stocks:
G = s+ αp, (1.6)
where α is the amount of stocks/options awarded to the manager.
In addition to the monetary compensation, a non-monetary side payment, b, plays
an important role. Let U be the utility of the manager, and
U = G(m)b(m), (1.7)
in which G is the total compensation of the manager, and m ∈ {mL,mH} is the
manager’s choice of monitoring level. If he chooses the low level of monitoring, mL,
then b = b(mL) > 1. In contrast, if the manager chooses the high level of monitoring,
12The price-to-surplus sensitivity can also vary with competition such that λ is larger under strong
competition and smaller under weak competition. This interpretation is introduced in Section 1.5
where we analyze whether and how is the effect of equity pay on wages affected by competition.
13This setting abstracts from the uncertainty in measuring the manager’s effort which has been a
focus of the literature on optimal contract design. For recent theories incorporating this uncertainty
in analyzing the CEO’s overpay and rent extraction problem, please see Skott & Guy (2013) and
Bénabou & Tirole (2016).
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mH , then b = 1. Denote the manager’s utility as UL when choosing mL, and UH when
choosing mH , we have
 UH = G(mH)b(mH) = s+ αpH = GH ;UL = G(mL)b(mL) = (s+ αpL)b = (GH − αpHλ)b. (1.8)
Put Equation (1.2), (1.7) and (1.8) together, one can see that the manager and
workers are in a two-way stick-and-carrot relationship. On the one side of the rela-
tionship, the manager can choose between high monitoring and high wage policies,
and consequently faces the trade-off between a higher total compensation and the pri-
vate benefit. One the other side, workers may either receive lower wages and refuse
to give private benefit to the manager, or receive higher wages and keep a peaceful
relationship with the manager.
From the shareholder’s point of view, to elicit high level of monitoring to increase
surplus and stock price, the optimal contract should satisfy both the participation
constraint
GH ≥ Ḡ, (1.9)
where Ḡ is the manager’s outside option,14 and the incentive-compatibility constraint
such that
GH ≥ (GH − αpHλ)b. (1.10)
By rearranging the conditions we obtain
αpH ≥ GHβ, (1.11)
14Whether the participation constraint is binding or not, the analyses of this simple model remain
intact. It’s conceivable that several factors that are left out of this simple model may cause the
participation constraint unbinding, such as increases in firm-level volatility (Skott & Guy, 2013),
CEO may be paid for luck (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), or CEO may capture the pay-setting
process (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). These are all related to the issue of optimal design of compensation
which is not the focus of this paper.
13




denotes the equity-based pay fraction.15 Note that β = β(b, λ),
and βb > 0, that is, β needs to be higher if the private benefit b is larger, to induce
the manager to give up the private benefit and to choose high-level monitoring. In
contrast, βλ < 0, i.e., β can be lower and still generates enough rewards to the
manager, if the increase in the firm’s stock price brought by the manager’s monitoring
effort being larger.
1.2.2.3 Two measures of compensation structure and the effect on wage
To link the theory with empirical analyses closely, we need to specify the two
measures, Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio, and restate the prediction. In Equation
(1.9), by shifting GH to the left, we can compute Equity Fraction, β
F , that incentivizes









= βF ≥ β.
(1.12)
An incentive compensation scheme set by the shareholder will aim to give the manager
a βF > β, which can be achieved by increasing α, given pH , β, and
∂βF
∂α
> 0. A larger
α and therefore a larger βF will be more likely larger than β, such that the wage,




. That is, more equity-based pay, measured as higher
Equity Fraction, will leads to lower wages.16
Finally, it’s easy to see that the alternative measure, Equity Ratio, βR, works as
a proxy for Equity Fraction, since it is defined as
15Here we restrict λ ≥ 1− 1b so that β ≤ 1.
16Ordover & Shapiro (1984) and Skott & Guy (2007) had analyzed how the improvement of
supervision technology may reduce workers’ wages, as a process of power-biased technology change,
or PBTC, vis-à-vis skill-biased technology change (SBTC). In the context of PBTC, the simple
model presented here can be viewed as emphasizing that even after new supervision technology









where 0 ≤ βF ≤ 1 such that βR will move at the same direction as βF .
1.3 Basic Evidence on the Effects of Equity-Based Pay on
Wages
1.3.1 Data Sources and Measurements of Variables
The main dataset for following analyses is the firm-level sample based on the
firm information from Compustat, which is matched with CEOs’ information from
Execucomp, and workers’ characteristics from CPS measured at the industry level,
over the period 1992-2016.17
Compustat provides balance sheet and other financial information for publicly-
traded firms in the U.S., which are collected from firms’ annual reports and other
filings to the SEC. Execucomp contains detailed information of top executives’ com-
pensations, such as salary, bonus, pension, stock award and stock option, and per-
sonal characteristics such as gender and age, that are collected from firms’ annual
proxy reports (DEF14A SEC form). Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly
survey of about 60,000 participating households, a sample representing the civilian
non-institutional U.S. population, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We use the Annual Social and Economic Supple-
ment (ASEC), or the “March supplement”, of the CPS which contains more demo-
graphic details than surveys in other months and has been extensively used in the
literature. A set of worker characteristics, such as gender, race, education, union
17The matched data set begins at 1992 because Execucomp starts at 1992. A data set based on
Forbes surveys contains executive compensation data before 1992, but its measurements does not
allow the calculation of equity-based fraction of total compensation. Nonetheless we thanks Kevin
Murphy for sharing the data with me.
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coverage, etc., are calculated as proportions at the 2-digit SIC industry level. The
details of matching methods are explained in Appendix 1.
1.3.1.1 The dependent variable: wage
Throughout the firm-level analyses, the dependent variable is log(yearly average
wage) of each firm-year observation. We use the labor and related expense (Com-
pustat item: xlr), subtract by the total amount of executive compensation of all
top-five managers, divide it by the number of employees (Compustst item: emp), and
then take natural log. The labor and related expense variable in Compustat includes
salary and wage, other benefit plans, payroll taxes, pension costs, profit sharing, and
incentive compensation. So this comprehensive measurement is less likely to be bi-
ased by the changes in the composition of earning when, say, salary decreases while
health insurance increases.
1.3.1.2 Explanatory variables: Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio
To capture the relative importance of equity-based pay to the manager, explana-
tory variables consist of two measurements of executive compensation structure, Eq-
uity Fraction and Equity Ratio. The former is measured as the sum of stock awards
and stock options values divided by the value of total compensation, and the later is
measured as the sum of stock awards and stock options values divided by the value
of salary. As explained in Section 1.2, a higher Equity Fraction or Equity Ratio, and
therefore a heavier weight of equity-based pay in the managerial compensation, is
expected to align managers’ interests closer with shareholders’ interests and lead to
wage reductions.
In calculating the values of equity-based pay, we generally use the standard Black-
Scholes/fair-value measures to represent the ex ante evaluations of compensation
values at the beginning of a business year when executives plan their work. They
16
are also more available through the whole period, and widely used in the literature.18
Please see Appendix 2 for more details.
Many studies investigate the differences between stock awards and stock options
regarding risk-taking behaviors. Based on the simple theory in Section 1.2, however,
the effects of stock awards and stock options on wages are indistinguishable and both
are negative. To check whether that’s the case empirically, we decompose equity-
based pay into stock awards and stock options, and calculate their fractions and
ratios against total compensation and salary respectively.
Although this paper focuses on equity-based pay, researchers and policy makers
are also interested in the performance pay in general which include bonus and various
non-equity incentives in addition of equity. Besides, it’s interesting to explore whether
equity-based and non-equity-based pay have different effects on wages. Since bonus
and non-equity incentives usually target certain accounting metrics rather than stock
performance, it’s likely that their effect on wages may be different from equity. We
therefore construct two additional variables: total performance pay fraction and ratio,
and non-equity performance pay fraction and ratio. The former includes equity-based
pay, bonus, and long-term incentive pay, while the later excludes equity-based pay.
Most literature on corporate governance/control focus only on CEOs. In a large
firm, however, given the complex process of decision making and division of labor,
it’s not very clear whether the CEO is the only person, or the most influential one, in
determining the wage policy. To investigate this issue, we calculate Equity Fraction
and Equity Ratio for other high-rank managers, and create corresponding non-CEO
variables by taking averages across these managers.
18As reported in Hopkins & Lazonick (2016), the definitions and measurements of several com-
pensation elements in Execucomp database had changed over the period, and some measures are
available for shorter periods. In contrast to the Black-Scholes/fair-value measures, for example,
the realized-value measures are ex post valuations whose values may be relatively uncertain to the
executives at the beginning of a year, and they are available only after 2006.
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1.3.1.3 Control variables
We control for four groups of factors including manager, firm, and worker charac-
teristics, and a set of fixed effects.
Manager characteristics. Aside from the compensation structures, managers’ pow-
ers in controlling the firm vis-à-vis shareholders are relevant to the determination of
wages, as the theory predicts that a powerful manager tends to collude with workers
by paying them higher wages. Together with the compensation structures, they mea-
sure the extent and mechanisms of alignment between the interests of executives and
shareholders in the context of principal-agent relationship. We include two measure-
ments to proxy for the managers’ controlling powers. First, CEO-chair duality. The
board of directors is supposed to select and supervise the CEO. If the CEO is also the
board chair, the check and balance effect is weakened, giving the CEO more discre-
tionary power, though not necessarily more independence from shareholders. Second,
whether the CEO is hired from outside. A CEO promoted through the long ladder
within a firm may have more connections and influences among his or her cowork-
ers, while an externally-hired CEO may rely more on the supports of shareholders.
A large literature finds that women make economic decisions differently (Croson &
Gneezy, 2009), so we include managers’ gender as one control variable.
Firm characteristics. At the firm level, we control for firms’ capital structure
(leverage) and capital expenditure, scale (total assets), and labor productivity (sales
per employee). We add firm-specific time trends (firm’s age) to control for the growth
path of each firm. We also control for the firm’s foreign activity (weather the firm
receives any foreign incomes or pay foreign taxes), since the literature has shown that
firms engaged in exports and foreign investments are systematically different from
those who don’t in may aspects (Melitz & Redding, 2014; Helpman, 2011).
Worker characteristics. To control for workers’ individual characteristics, we in-
clude variables of race, gender, age, education, union coverage, experience, part-time
18
status, urban residence, and marital status. All these individual characteristics are
calculated as proportions at the SIC 2-digit industry-year level using CPS data.
Fixed effects. Bertrand & Mullainathan (1999; 2003) find that managers’ incen-
tives may be affected by the anti-takeover legislation which vary by state and year,
depending on where the firm incorporates. To control for this anti-takeover legislature
effect, we include the incorporation state where the firm incorporates and interact it
with years. We also control for firm-, state-, industry- and year-fixed effects through
the firm-level analyses, and report robust standard errors adjusted for clustering of
the observations at the firm level.
Product market competition may affect workers’ wages and executive compensa-
tion simultaneously. For example, as the intensive product market competition leads
to lower wages, firms may feel more (or less) compelled to use high-power compensa-
tion to incentivize managers when product market competition intensifies. To control
for the effects of product market competition, we include the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) at the SIC 2-digit industry level based on the complete Compustat
database (not just the firms reporting wages). Note that in Section 1.3 and 1.4
we simply control for product market competition, rather than addressing the issue
whether competition reduces the effects of equity-based pay on wages. The latter
issue will be examined in Section 1.5.
1.3.1.4 Summary Statistics
We require all observations to have all variables discussed above without any
missing value. The resulted sample contains 5,579 firm-years and 651 unique firms
covering the period of 1992 to 2016. The sample includes many well-known big firms,
such as Boeing, General Motors, American Airlines, and MacDonald’s in the non-
financial sector, and Bank of America, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman
Sachs in the financial sector.
19
Note that about 44% of firms in this sample belong to the “F.I.R.E.” sector, i.e.,
the finance, insurance, and real estate sector, as shown in Table 1.1, but they account
for just about 21% of total employment. This raises a concern of heterogeneity among
sectors, especially between non-financial and financial sectors, and whether this biases
our analyses based on the whole sample. We address this concern in Section 1.3.3
where we find the effects are similar between non-financial and financial sectors and
remain unaffected after controlling for industry-year fixed effects.
Table 1.2 reports definitions and summary statistics of our variables. The primary
focus is on managers’ Equity Fraction and Equity Ratio, and workers’ wages. First,
the incentive measure of most interest is the equity-based pay (stock award and
stock option) fractions (divided by total compensation) and ratios (divided by salary)
for CEOs and non-CEOs. We find that the magnitudes are substantial, and non-
CEOs generally have less incentive compensation than CEOs but not far behind.
On average, Equity Fraction is 36.7% for CEOs, and 29.8% for non-CEOs. Equity
Ratio is 3.26 for CEOs and 2.3 for non-CEOs. Next, aside from the equity, non-
equity performance pay is also important. For CEO, the non-equity performance pay
constitutes 22.7% of CEOs’ total compensations, and 21.2% for non-CEOs. Measured
against salary, the non-equity performance pay to salary ratio is 1.69 for CEOs and
1.29 for non-CEOs. In terms of the CEO’s controlling power of the firm, on average
the probability of a CEO also serving as the board chair is 54.9%.19 On average, the
CEO owns 2.4% of the firm’s total shares. Finally, the average yearly wage is 83,749
dollars, which include various benefits and incentive pay to employees, with a large
standard deviation, 66,509 dollars (in 2010 value).20
19The U.S. has a particularly high probability of CEO-chair duality comparing to other countries.
It is declining in the recent decades thanks to the shareholder movements, including working-class
shareholders (Webber 2018: 112-113).
20In our sample, low-average wage (< 25 thousand dollars) and normal/high-wage observations
co-exist in many industries, but Eating And Drinking Places industry (SIC 58) contains about 70%
of all low-wage observations and no high-wage observation. Nonetheless, our results remain intact
20
Table 1.1. Distributions of firms across major industries (%), the firm-level sample
Sector (1-digit SIC, division) Firms Employments
Mining and Construction 1.52 1.37
Manufacturing 1: Food, Textile, Chemicals, etc. 8.28 7.23
Manufacturing 2: Rubber, Machinery, Electronics, etc. 5.52 16.27
Transportation, Communications, Electric, etc. 19.29 21.51
Wholesale Trade & Retail Trade 8.75 17.84
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 44.27 21.37
Services 1: Hotel, Personal Business, Motion Picture, etc. 5.47 4.88
Services 2: Health, Legal, Education, Social, etc. 6.9 9.54













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We estimate a standard fixed effect model as follows:
log(wkjsct) = αkjsct + βXkjst + γMkjst + δIkjst + φVjt + µFjsct + εkjsct, (1.14)
where w is the yearly total wage, so log(wkjst) is the log wage of firm k in industry j
in state s and incorporation state c at year t. The firm-fixed effects are included in
αkjsct. Xkjsct denotes managerial compensation structures including Equity Fraction,
Equity Ratio, etc. Mkjst includes other manager characteristics and three variables
of managerial controlling power. Ikjst includes firm characteristics, and Vjt includes
ten workers’ characteristics at the industry level. Fjsct are industry-, state-, year-
, and incorporation-state-year fixed effects, and HHI by industry-year. The robust
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The estimations of β is of particular
interest in the following analyses.
1.3.2 Results from basic correlation analyses
Table 1.3 reports basic results of estimation. Consistent with the theoretical
prediction, column (1) and (2) show that all else equal, an increase in CEO Equity
Fraction by one standard deviation (25.9%) is associated with 1.5% lower wages.
An increase in Equity Ratio is also negatively associated with wages, although not
statistically significant at the 10% level. The effect of non-CEO Equity Fraction in
column (3) is stronger than the result of CEO Equity Fraction, while the effect of
non-CEO Equity Ratio (column (4)) is also weaker and statistically insignificant.
Next, we decompose the equity-based pay into stock awards and stock options to
check whether their effects on wages are the same. In Table 1.4, column (1) and (2)
show the effects of Stock Fraction (stock awards divided by the total compensation)
and Option Fraction (Stock options divided by the total compensation), while column
(5) and (6)shows the effects of Stock Ratio (stock awards divided by salary) and Option
Ratio (stock options divided by salary). Except Stock Ratio which is statistically
insignificant, the coefficients of all other three measures show clear negative effects on
wages. These findings strengthen the theoretical prediction that more equity-based
pay, be it stock or option, correlates with lower wages.
We further test the effects of the performance pay as a whole, and the effects of
non-equity performance pay in particular. The results of column (3) and (7) show
that performance pay as a whole tends to have negative effects on wages. This is
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not surprising given the fact that most of the performance pay are equity-based. In
contrast, while also being parts of the performance pay, the results of column (4) and
(8) show that non-equity elements have positive effects on wages. This interesting
result appears again in our robustness tests based on an individual-level sample in
Section 1.3.3.3.
Table 1.3. Effects of Equity-Fraction and Equity-Ratio on Wages, Baseline Results
Dependent Variable: Log(Yearly Average Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO equity-based pay fraction -0.058***
(0.021)
CEO equity/salary ratio -0.002
(0.001)
Non-CEO equity-based pay fraction -0.114***
(0.034)
Non-CEO equity/salary ratio -0.001
(0.001)
Manager characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, state-, and year-fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.307 0.305 0.309 0.304
Observations 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579
Number of firms 651 651 651 651
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Equity based pay fraction is defined as the fraction of stock award and stock option in the executive total
compensation. Equity/salary ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of
salary. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus), CEO-chair
duality, externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, sales per
employee, total assets, leverage ratio, capital expenditure divided by total assets, and firm’s age. Worker
characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, experience, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban
residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions at the 2-SIC digit-year level. Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.4. Effects of Four Components of Compensation, Firm-Level Sample
Dependent Variable: Log(Yearly Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CEO stock award fraction -0.044*
(0.027)
CEO stock option fraction -0.045*
(0.024)
CEO performance pay -0.036
fraction (0.023)
CEO non-equity perf. pay 0.051**
fraction (0.025)
CEO stocks award ratio 0.000
(0.002)
CEO stock options ratio -0.003**
(0.002)
CEO performance pay -0.001
ratio (0.001)




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics by
industry-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by
firm-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, state-,
and year-fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-
fixed effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.305 0.304 0.306 0.304 0.305
Observations 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579
Number of firms 651 651 651 651 651 651 651 651
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Performance pay fraction is defined as the fraction of bonus + long-term incentive pay + equity-based pay,
till 2005; CEO’s non-equity incentive pay + equity-based pay, since 2006, in the executive total compensation. Stock
award and stock option fractions are defined as the value of stock award and stock option divided by the value of the
executive total compensation. Stock award/salary ratio and stock option/salary ratio are defined as the value of
stock award and stock option divided by the value of salary. Non-equity performance pay fraction is defined as the
fraction of bonus + long-term incentive pay till 2005, non-equity incentive pay since 2006, in the executive total
compensation. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus),
CEO-chair duality, externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy,
sales per employee, total assets, leverage ratio, capital expenditure divided by total assets, and firm’s age. Worker
characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, experience, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban
residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions at the 2-SIC digit-year level. Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
1.3.3 Robustness tests
To address several potential concerns regarding our baseline results based on the
firm-level sample, in this section we report results from a set of robustness tests. First,
a sample selection bias may occur because only about 20% of the firms in Compustat
report labor expenses. To deal with this concern, we estimate the Heckman bias
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correction model and find similar results (Section 1.3.3.1). We further estimate the
same model using the individual-level sample which does not suffer from the problem,
and still find consistent results (Section 1.3.3.3).21
Second, we examine if our baseline results are biased due to the over-representation
of financial firms in the firm-level sample, or omitting the industry-year specific
shocks. The results suggest that our baseline results are reliable. The literature
on managerial incentives typically focuses on the managerial shareholding. We find
that controlling for managerial shareholdings does not change our baseline results
(Section 1.3.3.2).
Third, another concern is composition changes, which refers to the problem that,
due to business offshoring, the labor expenses reported by firms include wages paid
to employees hired in foreign countries. If the wages of the foreign employees are
different from the ones in the U.S., a lower mean wage of the firm may reflect either
a composition change, a true wage reduction for all workers, or a mix of both. My
analyses based on the individual-level sample which includes only workers in the U.S.,
verify that the negative effects remain statistically significant (Section 1.3.3.3).
1.3.3.1 Sample selection bias
Because firms have not been required to disclose workers’ wages under the U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) until very recently,22 only about
20% of firms have reported wages, and they tend to be larger and concentrate in
especially the financial sector, as shown in Table 1.1. This raises a concern of sample
selection bias.
To address the concern of selection bias, we estimate Heckman’s (1976) two-step
correction model and report the results in Appendix 3, Table 1.7. Following the ap-
proach of Shin (2014), we estimate a series of probit models to identify variables that
predict the probability of reporting labor cost, and then find out which ones do not af-
fect the wage level by running a set of regressions with all explanatory variables. The
diagnostics suggest that firms reporting selling, general, and administrative expenses
21These results are consistent with recent studies using the same average wage data based on
Compustat, such as Chemmanur, Cheng, & Zhang (2013) and Faleye, Reis & Venkateswaran (2013).
22With the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
U.S. firms will need to disclose the median employee compensation, the CEO’s compensation, and
the ratio of the two, starting at 2018.
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(Compustat item: xsga) are unlikely to disclose labor costs due to some accounting
practices that are unrelated to the wage level. Therefore we use a binary variable
indicating whether the firm reports selling, general, and administrative expenses as
the selection variable in the Heckman models. As shown in Table 1.7 (Appendix 3),
the results from Heckman models are similar with the baseline results in Table 3 and
confirm the negative correlation between managerial equity-based pay and workers’
wages.
1.3.3.2 Non-finance vs. finance, industry-year-fixed effects, and manage-
rial shareholding
We further perform two other robustness tests and report the results in Appendix
4. First, since about 44% of the firms in the sample concentrate in the financial
sector, there is a concern whether the heterogeneity across different industries biases
the estimation. We divide the sample into non-financial and financial sectors and
estimate the same model. As shown in Appendix 4 Table 1.8 from Column (1) to (4),
non-financial firms show the same effects as the whole sample. Although the statistical
significance of the CEO Equity Fraction or Equity Ratio in financial sector is weaker,
the results are still consistent and show negative associations of equity-based pay on
wages.
Second, it’s possible that a temporary shock specific to one industry-year may
lead the firms of the industry-year to increase executive equity-based pay and hire
more temporary, low-wage workers. To address this issue, we add industry-year-fixed
effects in to the model to control for potential shocks specific to an industry-year. As
shown in Appendix 4 Table 1.8 Column (5) and (6), the results remain similar with
our baseline results.
Third, to compare with the literature that focus on the effect of managerial share-
holding, we include the CEO’s shareholding fraction in controlling variables, measured
by the percentage of the firm’s stocks owned by the CEO. As shown in Appendix 4
Table 1.8 Column (7) and (8), controlling for managerial shareholding does not change
our baseline results.
31
1.3.3.3 Sample selection bias, and composition changes by offshoring:
tests using the individual-level sample
A concern of the firm-level sample is that a lower mean wage of the firm may reflect
firms’ offshorings to low-wage countries rather than direct wage reductions. One way
to address this concern is to construct a sample containing only workers in the U.S.
economy for analysis. We use individual U.S. workers’ data (CPS) who are hired
in big firms (employing 500 workers and more), and then match them with CEO’s
compensation structure and firms’ information, also limiting to big firms, calculated
at the 2-digit industry level.23 This produces a multi-year, cross-sectional data set
with the basic unit being an U.S. worker. Compared to the firm-level sample in which
we have individual firms’ and managers’ information with workers’ characteristics at
the industry level, here we have an individual worker-level sample with firms’ and
managers’ characteristics at the industry level. Since the information of firm and
manager covered in this sample is not constrained by whether the firm reports labor
expenses, this sample is comprehensive and does not suffer from the concern of sample
selection bias. Details of the sample, summary statistics, model specification, and the
regression tables are reported in Appendix 5.
With the individual-level sample, we estimate a cross-section model in which the
log hourly wage of individual workers is the dependent variable, and the industry-level
CEO Equity Fraction or Equity Ratio, is the explanatory variable, controlling for a
rich set of individual-level characteristics including occupation which is not feasible
in the firm-level sample. We further test whether the results vary with two different
measures of wages: one includes and the other excludes the amount of employer’s
contribution for health insurance, since the accuracy of reports of the contributions
may be a concern.
Across these settings, results from this individual-level sample are similar with
our baseline results. As shown in Appendix 5 Table 1.11 column (1) and (2), the
effects of the equity-based pay on wages are all negative and statistically significant.
23Since CPS contains significant amount of employees who work in small firms, while the Compu-
stat and Execucomp data tend to be reported by big firms, we require individual workers, firms, and
managers in the matched data set all to be in big firms, defined as a firm hired at least 500 employees.
In this way although we can’t link individual workers precisely to their firms, and many workers not
employed in the firms in the Compustat-Execucomp linked database are inevitably included in, the
workers in the sample should overlap largely with our targeted firms’ employees.
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All else equal, an increase in CEO Equity Fraction by one standard deviation (12.4%)
is associated with 0.46% lower wages, and an inrease in CEO Eqyuity Ratio by one
standrad deviation (3.959) is associated with 0.15% lower wages. Column (3) and
(4) show that the results are not affected if we exclude the employer’s contribution
for health insurance from the measure of wage. These results are consistent with
the theoretical prediction, and verify that at least parts of the negative effects of
equity-based pay on wages in previous sections are not driven by offshorings. They
also suggest that the concern of sample selection bias may not be too serious.
Next, as in the analyses of the firm-level sample, We decompose the equity-based
pay into stocks and options, and also compute variables for performance pay and non-
equity performance pay. As shown in Table 1.12, the directions of the coefficients of
most variables are the same as in the firm-level analyses (Table 1.4), although the
magnitudes are smaller. On the one hand, more stock awards and stock options also
associate with lower wages, and so do performance pay, consisting with our theoretical
prediction. On the other hand, non-equity performance pay associates with higher
wages both in the firm-level and the individual-level samples. This interesting result,
however, should be treated with caution, because there is no clear theory to rigorously
guide our estimation and prediction, and the designs of non-equity performance pay
(bonuses and long-term incentives) are likely to be more complex and diverse among
firms than equity-based pay.
1.4 Identification Strategy
The analyses in the previous sections show that workers’ wages are lower as man-
agers receive more equity-based pay. However, the correlation may not mean causality.
There might be unobserved factors, such as a technology change and a worrisome busi-
ness outlook, affecting both managers’ compensation structures and workers’ wages
and creating the negative correlation we saw in Section 1.3. To test whether the effect
is causal or not, we need to identify a change in the managerial compensation struc-
ture that is unrelated to these unobserved factors. In this section, we utilize a change
in the corporate tax policy as an instrumental variable for the CEO’s compensation
structure and implement the IV estimation. Section 1.4.1 explains the institutional
background and the choice of my instrumental variable. Section 1.4.2 presents the
model specification and estimation results.
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1.4.1 Internal Revenue Code 162(m) and the construction of IV
Enacted by Congress in 1993, section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code limits
the deductibility of top five executives’ non-performance-related compensations over
$1 million, and imposes a 60% federal surtax on salaries above $1 million. In this
way, the legislation encourages firms to increase the use of performance pay rather
than fixed salary while leaving open the total amounts of compensations. Respond-
ing to the legislation, several studies found that firms originally paying higher salaries
reduced salaries to $1 million, and firms originally paying lower raised salaries over
time but didn’t go above $1 million (Perry & Zenner, 2001; Rose & Wolfram, 2002).
At the same time, the growth of the total amounts of executive compensation has
been unaffected by the legislation. Firms simply switched from salary to other forms
of compensations such that the structure of executive compensation has became more
equity-based and more sensitive to firms’ (stock market) performance (Perry & Zen-
ner, 2001; Balsam & Ryan, 2007).
As shown in Figure 1.1, in my firm-level sample there is indeed a significant, ab-
normal bunch of firms paying CEOs’ salaries right at the tax deductibility threshold,
one million dollars. Further, in Figure 1.2, by graphing the distribution separately in
every five-years period, we can see clearly that this bunch grows higher and higher
over each period. This implies that many firms indeed are affected by legislation and
freeze CEOs’ salaries at the threshold, and the amount of firms affected grows over
time. In this case, if the firms want to pay their CEOs more, they are more likely
raise performance pay especially the equity-based pay, and we will see a change in
the compensation structure as a result.
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Figure 1.1. The bunching distribution of firms by CEO’s salary, whole-sample period
(1992-2016)
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Figure 1.2. The bunching distribution of firms by CEO’s salary, five-year periods
A few issues need to be dealt with before we can utilize the legislation as an instru-
ment for estimation. First, is the choice of measurement. The key compensation item
this legislation aimed to limit is salary, so the effect of the legislation on compensation
structure would be captured more precisely by a measurement of equity-based pay
relative to salary, rather than the shareholding as commonly used in the literature.
Two measurements of CEO equity-based compensation, Equity-Fraction and Equity-
Ratio, are used in the previous analyses. The former is expected to be too noisy in
measuring and interpreting the change, because it uses total compensation as the de-
nominator which includes salary, bonus, equity, non-equity incentives, etc, and many
of them may also change as equity increases, and the effects can be complex. There-
fore, to capture the policy change more precisely, a natural choice of measurement
seems to be the equity-based pay-to-salary ratio. To pin down the interpretation,
we further focus on the CEO in the following analyses but continue controlling for
variables of non-CEO managers’ controlling powers.
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Second, to analyze the causal effect, we need to identify the treatment imposed
on firms. While CEOs’ compensation structures may change, which firms were really
affected by the legislature is not completely clear. Intuitively, the treatment effect
of Section 162(m) on firms’ decisions works in a way of a probability over a certain
range of CEOs’ salaries rather than a sharp discontinuity starting at $1 million dollars.
Besides, since CEOs’ salaries would likely move toward the threshold over time from
both sides, the area around the threshold is definitely the center of the range of
treatment and will be our main focus, but what the lower and upper bounds of
the range are remain uncertain. We therefore try different treatment ranges in the
following analyses.
Based on the above considerations, We use two variables as our instrument for the
change in CEO’s Equity Ratio: a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO’s salary
falls into the treatment range since 1994, and the CEO’s salary level controlling for the
simple arithmetic relationship between the amount of salary and the ratio. Since the
legislature and whether a CEO’s salary falls into the treatment range are exogenously
determined and orthogonal to workers’ wages, we argue that the first variable satisfies
the exclusion restriction of instrumental variable. The second variable might be of
some concern to firms that want to keep the gap between CEOs’ total compensation
and the average wages within certain ranges. Fortunately, since salary is a relatively
small part of CEO’s total compensation and determined in a process separately from
the determination of the mean wage, and we also control for the sum of salary plus
bonus to control for the possible relationship between the CEO’s total compensation
and workers’ wages, we argue that the concern is not serious and the IV satisfies the
requirement.
1.4.2 IV estimations
We estimate a two-stage-least-square model in which the first stage is:
Xkjsct = α1 + ηZkt + γMkjst + δIkjst + φVjt + µFjsct + εkjsct; (1.15)
and the second stage is:
log(wkjsct) = α2 + βX̂kjst + γMkjst + δIkjst + φVjt + µFjsct + εkjsct. (1.16)
where Xkjsct is the CEO Equity Ratio, Zkt is our instruments including a treatment
range dummy and the level of salary. The definitions of other variables are the same
as in Equation (1.14). The coefficient β is our main focus in the following analyses.
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In terms of the controlling variables, one difference between the IV and the previ-
ous OLS estimations is that we include the CEO’s non-equity performance pay ratio
in the IV estimation. Because our instrument, the tax policy change, allows all types
of performance pay enjoying tax deductions. In responding to the policy change, firms
may increase not only equity-based performance pay but also the non-equity ones.
Moreover, as shown in Section 1.3.2 Table 1.4, the CEO’s non-equity performance pay
does associate with higher wages. In this case, if we omit the non-equity performance
pay, the effect of out instrument on wages will likely go through this omitted variable,
and violate the exclusion restriction.24
Another difference is the control of firm-fixed effects (or CEO-fixed effects). While
we control for firm-fixed effects in previous estimations, doing so will understandably
invalidate the instrument, particularly the treatment range dummy, since firms do
not switch in and out of the treatment frequently, there is not enough variation of
the treatment within firms. In spite of this limitation, we had compared the CEO’s
Equity Ratio effects before and after controlling for the firm-fixed effects (using the
model in column (2) of Table 1.3), and found that the sign of the coefficients remains
the same while the magnitudes are very similar. This suggests that the concern of
leaving out firm-fixed effects would be moderate.
The results of IV estimation are reported in Table 1.5. Due to the uncertainty
of the treatment range of the legislation, columns (1) to (4) try various bounds of
the treatment range which all include the bunching center, $1 million dollars. For
example, column (1) shows the results from using a treatment range covering salaries
starting at 750 thousand dollars.
24The results are very similar if we include non-equity performance pay in the baseline analyses.
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Table 1.5. Evidence on Causality, IV Estimation (LIML Estimator)
Treatment range 750- 850- 950- 1000-
($Salary, thousand dollars; year ≥ 1994) (1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage Dependent Variable: CEO equity/salary ratio
Treatment range dummy 0.684** 0.886*** 0.936*** 0.536
(0.314) (0.302) (0.323) (0.33)
Salary -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1st-stage F of IV 8.69 9.51 9.82 5
MOP effective F 5.82 6.91 6.83 5.48
Second Stage Dependent Variable: Log(Yearly Average Wage)
CEO equity/salary ratio -0.047* -0.041* -0.039*
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
CLR test p-value (H0: β = 0) 0.023 0.029
CLR 95% conf. sets [-.111, -.006] [-.1, -.004]
Controlling Variables
Manager characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-, industry-, and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579
Number of firms 651 651 651 651
Robust S.E. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered at firms.
Notes. Column (1) to (4) are results using treatment ranges of 750/850/950/1000 thousand dollars and above.
Equity based pay/salary ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary.
Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus), CEO-chair
duality, externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender, the CEO’s and non-CEO’s non-equity performance pay ratios.
Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, sales per employee, total assets, leverage ratio, capital
expenditure divided by total assets, and firm’s age. Worker characteristics include: gender, race, age, education,
experience, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions
at the 2-SIC digit-year level. All controlling variables are the same as in correlation analyses except the non-equity
performance pay ratio and firm-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
MOP effective F and CLR test p-value and confidence sets are reported following the recommendations by Andrews,
Stock, and Sun (2018).
The results from the first stage estimation suggest that our instruments are valid in
general, and the directions are also consistent with our prediction, i.e., the IRC 162(m)
legislation increases the use of equity based pay. The results are robust across various
choices of treatment ranges as long as the area around the threshold is included.
Otherwise, as shown in column (4), the dummy variable of the treatment fails to
capture the variation of CEO equity/salary ratio at 10% statistically significant level.
This is consistent with the implication that the estimated results are driven by the
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policy-induced change in the compensation structure around the threshold, rather
than unobservable factors varied with CEOs’ salaries.
The F- and Montiel Olea-Pflueger (MOP) effective F-statistics, however, are all
smaller than the rule-of-thumb value, 10, suggesting that our instruments are weak.
To deal with this issue, the results reported in Table 1.5 are based on the Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator25 which is more nearly centered
at the true value of the estimand (Stock & Watson, 2003: 467). In addition, we adopt
the weak-IV robust inference method suggested by Andrews, Stock & Sun (2018) and
report the results from Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) tests using the treatment
ranges of 850- and 950-. As shown in the column (2) and (3) in Table 1.5, the p-values
the CLR tests suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis that true value of the
estimand is zero, and the confidence sets do not include zero or the non-IV estimates
from our baseline results (-0.002), implying that our estimation is still reliable in spite
of weak instruments.
Based on the results of the second stage estimation, our IV estimation largely
agrees with our baseline OLS estimation: given the validity of the instrumental vari-
ables, the effect of CEO equity/salary ratio on wages is clearly negative, and the
coefficients in Column (2) and (3) are around -0.04 which are much stronger and
significant compared to the previous result in Table 1.3 column (2) (-0.002). This ev-
idence therefore indicates that one unit increase in the CEO’s equity-to-salary ratio,
say, from 1:1 to 2:1, will lead to about a 4% reduction in the average wage, all else
equal. Put it in another way, an increase in the CEO’s equity-to-salary ratio by one
standard deviation (4.06) will lead to 16.24% lower wages.
1.5 Whether and how is the effect of CEO equity Pay on
Wages affected by competition?
In previous analyses, we hold the degree of market competition constant by con-
sistently controlling for HHI. In this section, we move beyond the average results
25The original 2SLS results are very similar.
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and analyze whether and how is the effect of CEO equity pay on wages affected by
different degrees of market competition.26
1.5.1 Theory
A theory argues that corporate governance doesn’t matter in competitive markets,
because competition constantly forces managers to reduce any slack or waste for
surviving, with or without a good governance institution. Therefore, a change in
the governance institution should make little difference for firms’ performances when
competition is strong. Supporting this theory, Giroud & Mueller (2010) show that an
exogenous change in the anti-takeover regulation, which makes managers less likely
to be punished for shirking, has no impact on performances when the degree of
competition is at the high level, comparing to when competition degree is low.
Does this apply to the negative impact of CEO equity pay on wages as well? We
suspect not. Regarding the relationship with competition, a key difference between
other governance institutions and compensation is: other governance institutions are
designed to replicate the discipline of competition particularly when competition is
weak. Hence, it’s quite natural that governance makes little difference when compe-
tition is strong. In contrast, compensation is designed to translate market valuation
into the manager’s reward assuming that competition and market valuation work well.
Therefore the effect of compensation should be larger when competition is strong, but
may not function well when competition is weak.
More specifically, under strong competition, market valuation is more sensitive to
the change in firm performances, such that the same gap in performance can generate
a larger difference in stock prices, comparing to the case under weak competition.
Since equity-based compensation ties the manager’s reward to the stock price, a
26Please note that we keep focusing on the consequence of CEO compensation structure in this
section, rather than the cause of it. Regarding the later question, there is a large literature on the
product market competition effect on managerial incentive provisions, but the direction remains
indeterminate. For example, theoretically, while Hart (1983) suggests competition reduces the man-
agerial slacks implying less need for managerial incentive provisions, Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin
(1992), Schmidt (1997), and Raith (2003) argue that the effects vary with various conditions, and
the results can be ambiguous. Empirically, Cuñat & Guadalupe (2009) find that more competition
increases managerial incentive provisions and the sensitivity of pay to performance, but Fernandes,
Ferreira & Winters (2018) find opposite results. To investigate this question, one needs to identify
an exogenous change in the degree of competition, which is beyond the scope of this paper. In
this section, we simply show that Equity Ratio goes up with all three degrees of competition in our
first-stage estimation, and then keep focusing on the marginal effects.
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larger difference in prices means a larger difference in the manager’s monetary income
between keeping the peaceful labor relation or choosing high-level monitoring and
reducing wages. Therefore, at any given equity ratio, the opportunity cost for the
manager to keep the peaceful labor relation is higher under strong competition than
weak competition, such that the manager will more likely choose high-level monitoring
and reduce wages.
We can use the model presented in Section 1.2 to pin down the idea. In that
model, even under the assumption that a higher monitor level does not bring higher
outputs (y), because surplus (Π) is still affected by the manager’s choice of monitor
level, the manager may still be willing to exercise high-level monitoring and trade off
the private benefit from a peaceful life for equity income, as long as the equity ratio
is high enough. There, we implicitly assume that the sensitivity of stock price to
surplus is identical across industries, which may be more legitimate when analyzing
the average pattern. Now, if we are to analyze the possibly different impacts on wages
under different degrees of competition, we would let the price-to-surplus sensitivity
vary with the degree of competition. In addition, we would expect the price-to-surplus
sensitivity to be larger when competition level is high, where a small improvement in
efficiency can lead to a bigger reward, and a failure of doing so invites punishments
easily.
Let’s reinterpret λ in the stock market evaluation function (Section 1.2 Equation
(1.5)) as the indicator of the price-to-surplus sensitivity, and let λ to be larger in
cases of high competition. Since λ determines the gap in stock prices between high-
and low-surplus firms, a larger λ implies that market rewards a high surplus more
and also punishes a low surplus more. Then a larger λ translates into a smaller β in
Equation (1.11). According to Equation (1.12), this means that βF is more likely to
be larger than the small β under strong competition, such that the manager would
more likely choose high-level monitoring and reduce wages in those industries, all else
equal. If that’s the case, we would expect to see the negative impact of equity ratio
on wages to be larger when the degree of competition is high, which is a completely
reversed pattern of Giroud & Mueller (2010).
1.5.2 Model specification
To proceed, we utilize interaction terms following Giroud & Mueller (2010)’s ap-
proach. We first rank all Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at the same year from
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small to large and group them into 3 levels, in which 3 denotes the largest, 2 the
medium, and 1 the smallest. HHI=1 represents the high degree of competition, and
HHI=3 the low degree of competition. Then we add two interaction terms between
competition and Equity Ratio into our model in Section 1.4.2. Specifically, we fit the
following model on the firm-level sample we used in previous sections, in which the
first-stage estimate equations are:
Xkjsct = αkjsct + η11Zkt + η12ZktH(2)jt + η13ZktH(3)jt
+ η14H(2)jt + η15H(3)jt + η16Controlkjsct + εkjsct;
(1.17)
XkjsctH(2)jt = αkjsct + η21Zkt + η22ZktH(2)jt + η23ZktH(3)jt
+ η24H(2)jt + η25H(3)jt + η26Controlkjsct + εkjsct;
(1.18)
XkjsctH(3)jt = αkjsct + η31Zkt + η32ZktH(2)jt + η33ZktH(3)jt
+ η34H(2)jt + η35H(3)jt + η36Controlkjsct + εkjsct.
(1.19)
With the three instrumented variables, X̂kjsct, ̂XkjsctH(2)jt, and ̂XkjsctH(3)jt, we
then estimate the following model at the second stage:
log(wkjsct) = αkjsct + β0X̂kjsct + β1 ̂XkjsctH(2)jt + β2 ̂XkjsctH(3)jt
+ β3H(2)jt + β4H(3)jt + β5Controlkjsct + εkjsct,
(1.20)
where Zkt is our instruments including a treatment range dummy (salary ≥ 850
thousand dollars and year ≥ 1994) and the amount of salary. H(2)jt and H(3)jt
are binary variables indicating the HHI of level 2 (medium competition) and 3 (low
competition). Controlkjsct is the vector of all controlling variables we consistently
used in the previous sections. The coefficients β0, β1, and β2 are our focuses in the
following analyses.
1.5.3 Marginal effects vary with the degree of competition
We report the results in Table 1.6 where Column (1) to (3) contain results from
the first-stage estimation, and Column (4) the second-stage.27 In spite of the weak
instruments, we conclude the concern to be moderate based on the results of Angrist-
Pischke tests, and the similarity between LIML and 2SLS results. Column (1) and
(3) show signs indicating that the CEO equity ratio increases with the treatment no
27The results reported here are based on the LIML estimator. 2SLS results are very similar.
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matter competition is strong or weak, while Column (2) shows the increase when
competition level being medium is statistically insignificant.
With the clear signs of increases in the equity ratio particularly under high-degree
and low-degree of competition, our second-stage results show that their impacts on
wages are quite different. Interestingly, consistent with our theory, the impact is
the strongest when interacting with the high degree of competition. The coefficient,
−0.096, implies that an unit increase in CEO equity ratio, say, from 1:1 to 2:1, leads
to a 9.6% decline in the average wage when competition is strong, which is stronger
than our baseline average effect (4%). The magnitude of the impact tends to decrease
when interacting with lower degrees of competition. When interacting with weak
competition, the negative impact of CEO equity ratio on wages is the smallest, where
a unit increase in equity ratio leads to just 1.2% decline in the average wage.
Figure 1.3 plots the three marginal effects of CEO equity ratio on wages when
interacting with three levels of competition, and shows the negative impact to be
larger when interacting with higher degree of competition. The confidence intervals
show that while the effect under medium-level competition is often indistinguishable
from the effects under other competition levels, the effect under weak competition is
clearly different from, and smaller than, the effect under strong competition.
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Table 1.6. Marginal effects vary with the degree of competition: IV Estimation
(LIML)
First Stage Second Stage
Equity ratio Equity ratio
Equity ratio × HHI(2) × HHI(3) Log(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment dummy 1.626** 0.082 -0.017 Equity ratio -0.096***
(0.737) (0.318) (0.323) (0.036)
Salary -0.004** -0.002*** -0.003*** Equity ratio 0.026
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) × HHI(2) (0.055)
Treatment dummy -0.666 0.974 0.033 Equity ratio 0.084**
× HHI(2) (0.986) (0.907) (0.473) × HHI(3) (0.04)
Treatment dummy -0.728 -0.376 1.185** HHI(2) -0.104
× HHI(3) (0.83) (0.371) (0.533) (0.231)
Salary × HHI(2) 0.000 -0.000 0.001 HHI(3) -0.37**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.18)











Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics
by firm-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteris-
tics by industry-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-, industry-, and
year-fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-
year-fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579
Number of firms 651 651 651 651
Robust S.E. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered at firms.
Notes. Column (1) to (3) report the first-stage results for three endogenous variables. Column (4) reports the
second-stage results using the instrumented variables. Treatment dummy is define as 1 if the CEO’s salary ≥ 850
thousand dollars at year ≥ 1994. HHI(2) is a dummy indicating if the industry is at the second level of concentration
(a medium-competition industry). HHI(3) is a dummy indicating if the industry is at the third level of concentration
(a low-competition industry). Equity based pay/salary ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option
divided by the value of salary. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations
(salary + bonus), CEO-chair duality, externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender, the CEO’s and non-CEO’s
non-equity performance pay ratios. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, sales per employee, total
assets, leverage ratio, and firm’s age. Worker characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, experience, union
coverage, full/part-time status, urban residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions at the 2-SIC
digit-year level. All controlling variables are the same as in correlation analyses except the non-equity performance
pay ratio and firm-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Angrist-Pischke
F statistics and tests are designed for inference when using multiple instruments (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
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Figure 1.3. Marginal effects of equity ratio on wages, interacting with three levels
of competition
1.6 Conclusion
Does equity-based compensation, such as stock awards and stock options, incen-
tivize managers to pay their workers less? Evidence reported in is paper suggests it
does. Analyzing a sample that matches firm, manager, and worker information in the
U.S. economy over the period 1992-2016, we find that wages are negatively associated
with the CEO’s equity-based pay across various measures and model settings. Using
the change in corporate tax policy in 1993, IRC 162(m), as an exogenous factor in-
creasing the CEO compensation structure, we identify that a one unit increase in the
CEO’s equity-to-salary ratio, say, from 1:1 to 2:1, will lead to a 4% decline in average
wages.
Does intense product market competition reduce this negative effect? Our finding
suggests the opposite. A literature finds that when the degree of competition is high,
changes in corporate governance institutions have little effect on firms’ performances.
In contrast, we show that the negative effect of equity pay on wages is stronger under
strong competition than weak competition. A unit increase in the CEO’s equity-to-
salary ratio (from 1:1 to 2:1) will decrease the average wage by 9.6% under strong
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competition, but only by 1.2% under weak competition. Our finding highlights a
critical feature of equity-based compensation regarding its relationship to competi-
tion: equity-based compensation is designed to make the manager’s reward sensitive
to market valuation, assuming that market competition and valuation work well.
These results have several implications. First, researchers interested in causal
effects of executive compensation may benefit from the identification strategy used in
this paper. Second, if we count executive compensation as an institution of corporate
governance, our finding implies that some corporate governance institutions may still
matter in competitive markets, and the relationships between competition and various
corporate institutions may be heterogeneous and deserve more investigations. Third,
supplementing the current literature on monopsony and monopoly in the product
and labor markets, this paper suggests that the power relationship within firms has
important effects on wage outcomes as well. Fourth, in terms of policy, this paper
sheds light on a dark side of shareholder primacy in which shareholders’ wealth may be
at the cost of workers’ welfare. Public policy debates on executive compensation, and
on corporate governance in general, can be advanced by accounting for our findings
and giving a role to workers’ voices.
47
CHAPTER 2
DOES EQUITY-BASED PAY AMPLIFY CORPORATE
INVESTMENT HERDING?
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 The research question: the effect of equity-based pay on herd be-
havior
In 1907, the pioneer statistician Francis Galton went to the West of England Fat
Stock and Poultry Exhibition held in Plymouth, where people were participating
in a contest of guessing the actual weight of an ox, and those coming closet would
win. After reading guesses on 787 entries, Galton found that the median guess was
1,207, just 9 pounds over the actual weight, 1,198, and the average guess is even
closer: 1,197 (Galton, 1907; Jackson, 2019). This wisdom of the crowd is perhaps
why Keynes observed that when facing fundamental uncertainty about the future,
people tend to follow others’ moves as an easy guide, substituting for their own
judgements (Keynes, 1937). Interestingly, possibly inspired by his own experience
as an investor, Keynes emphasized more that people may herd as well when their
compensations and careers depend on others’ perceptions, such as the money manager
depends on investors, or the corporate executive depends on shareholders, for the
manager know that “it’s better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
unconventionally” (Keynes, 1936). Compared with these two views, one can not help
but ask: how would the herd behavior changes if we bring the compensation factor
into the first scenario?
After Keynes, the literature of the effect of compensation on herd behaviors devel-
oped two theories, in line with the above two views.1 The information-based theory
1I thanks Gerald Epstein’s insight that both views can be found in Keynes’ writings. There are
other theories of herding beyond the scope of this paper, like the behavioral theory (Shiller, 2015),
because its mechanisms are independent of the managerial compensation structure.
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(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992; Devenow & Welch, 1996)
suggests that the cause of herd behavior is managerial shirking from acquiring and
utilizing firm-specific information. Instead of working hard on his/her own to ex-
amine firm-specific information, as the ox weight speculators did a century ago, the
manager relies on the information of other firms in analyzing market conditions and
designing strategies. In this case, a more equity-based compensation can align the
manager’s incentive with shareholders’ interests such that he/she would invest more
efforts in firm-specific information and reduce herd behaviors.
In contrast, the compensation-based theory (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Branden-
burger & Polak, 1996; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1998; Holmström, 1999)2
suggests that herd behavior comes from the financial incentive of the manager, par-
ticularly when his/her compensation is tied to stock price. Since shareholders do
not obtain firm-specific information as the manager does, and stock price often re-
flects shareholders’ general sentiment (and herding sometimes), a manager under
equity-based compensation scheme can receive higher financial rewards by adopting
the strategy that fits with shareholders’ perceptions, rather than following the firm-
specific information known only to him/herself. In this case, a more equity-based
compensation will amplify the herd behavior.3
With opposite predictions from two well-articulated theories, it’s interesting to
see which one fits better with empirical evidence. Moreover, as Chief Executive
Officers and money managers received ever higher equity-based pays in the recent
decades, especially in the U.S., the significance of this question is anything but trivial.
2Scharfstein & Stein (1990) and Holmström (1999) emphasize more on the reputation, but in
terms of prediction, the reputation-based theory is consistent with other the compensation-based
theories in the sense that more equity-based pay makes the manager more concerned of shareholders’
evaluations which affect his/her career, and therefore becomes more enthusiastic in delivering what
market wants. Holmström (2016) recently express this view again in the context of the recent
financial crisis.
3An alternative, shareholder-view interpretation can be as follows: Typically the CEO seeks
private benefits by engaging in “empire building” such that the firm deviates from industry norm.
By raising the CEO’s equity pays, he/she would reduce “empire building” and convert to the norm.
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Surprisingly, the empirical studies on this question are still scarce,4 the few results
are mixed, and none of them addresses the endogeneity issue.
This paper examines these two theories by empirically investigating the relation-
ship between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s stock-based compensation and cor-
porate herding (co-movement) in investment. Specifically, I define investment herding
as the co-movement or correlation between industry-median investment changes and
firms’ investment changes, and examine whether higher equity-based pays increase or
decrease the industry-firm investment co-movement, using a CEO-firm matched sam-
ple covering non-financial firms in the U.S. economy over the period 1992-2016. We
find that more equity-based pay leads to less investment co-movement, and therefore
provide evidence for the information-based theory.
Several factors can affect both the firm’s investment decisions and the determi-
nation of the CEO’s compensation structure, and make the observed correlation be-
tween them non-causal. For example, an within-industry idiosyncratic change in
technology which occurs to some firms rather than others may reduce the investment
co-movement, and affects the CEO’s compensation by changing the requirements of
managerial skills. Alternatively, a firm facing a worrisome business outlook may de-
cide to try somethings innovative, therefore reducing the co-movement, while at the
same time paying the CEO more equity incentives.
To deal with these concerns and to identify the causal effect of the equity-based
pays on the co-movement, a major advance of this paper is to utilize a tax pol-
icy change (IRC 162(m)) as the instrument for the CEO’s compensation structure.
The Section 162(m) of Internal Revenue Code in 1993 changed the corporate-tax
deductibility of CEO’s salary. Under this legislation, non-performance pay, mainly
salaries, paid to top-five managers above $1 million will be subjected to a 60% fed-
eral surtax. As a consequence, firms switch to forms of performance pay, especially
equity-based ones, to compensate their managers while keeping salaries at or below
the $1 million threshold. We use whether the CEO’s salary falls into the treatment
range around (and above) the threshold, and the amount of salary, as instruments
4Several extensive reviews of the executive compensation literature mention no study on this issue,
including Edmans, Gabaix & Jenter (2017), Murphy (2013), Aggarwal (2008), and Core, Guay &
Larcker (2003). Most literature on firms’ or individual investor’s herd behaviors omit this issue as
well. Please see Bikhchandani & Sharma (2000), Hirshleifer & Hong Teoh (2003), and Spyrou (2013)
for literature reviews.
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for changes in the CEO compensation structure measured by the equity-based-pay-
to-salary ratio.5
2.1.2 Related literature and contributions
As mentioned above, empirical studies of this issue are rare. The one closet to
this paper is Knyazeva, et al. (2008). They analyze the effects of a set of managerial
incentive and corporate governance institutions on the co-movement of non-financial
firm’s investments using samples of U.S. and non-U.S. non-financial firms. Their U.S.
firm sample contains about 8,000 firm-year observations over the period of 1995-2004.
They define co-movement as the influence of the industry-wide investment change on
the firm’s investment change, and find that managerial equity incentives relate to
more co-movement but remain statistically insignificant through various settings.6
In the management literature on business strategy, two studies, Carpenter (2000)
and Tang, et al. (2011), construct special deviation indices to measure the extent of
conformity of a firm’s strategy toward the average business strategy in the industry.
Carpenter (2000) finds that long-term pay structure associates positively with devi-
ation from the industry norm of business strategy (less herding). Tang, et al. (2011)
test the effect of the CEO’s and top management team’s stock options, but the signs
are not stable and coefficients remain statistically insignificant. However, these two
studies employ relatively small samples7, and their indices contain various factors in
complex ways, making them difficult to interpret and compare.8 More importantly,
their indices are designed to measure how different the firm (or the CEO) is from
the industry norm, while the framework of Knyazeva, et al. (2008) is to measure the
direction and magnitude of the firm’s change in response to the change of industry
5While this legislation and its effects on CEO compensation structures had been studied by
many, this paper is the first to transform it into an instrument and identify the causal effects of
compensation structure on firm outcomes.
6They also find that strong corporate governance, such as more activist shareholder (public
pension fund) ownership and more independent directors on the board, relates to less investment
co-movement, which is consistent with the broader prediction of information-based theory.
7Tang, et al. (2011) contain only 51 U.S. firms in computer industry during the period of 1997-
2003.
8Please see details in Appendix A.3 where we create indices following their methods and replicate
their results using our sample.
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norm, which is closer to the issue at hand. Therefore we decide to follow the empirical
framework of Knyazeva, et al. (2008).
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, this paper
contributes to the literature on firms’ herding behaviors9 by specifically investigat-
ing whether equity-based compensation strengthens or weakens investment herding
in the non-financial sector. Second, the information-based and compensation-based
theories are usually discussed separately. As emphasized by Bikhchandani & Sharma
(2000), it’s very difficult to distinguish between their effects by testing on their pre-
dictions. By focusing on the effect of equity-based pay on investment herding, this
paper provides a rare test on this issue that can help to distinguish the two major
theories on herding. Third, compared to Knyazeva, et al. (2008), this paper utilizes
the tax policy IRC 162(m) to identify the causal effect of the equity-based pay on the
investment co-movement. While our initial OLS estimation produces similar results
that equity incentives correlate to investment co-movement positively, our IV estima-
tion deals with the problem of endogeneity and finds the opposite, providing the first
causal information on this issue.
2.2 The definition of investment herding, model specifica-
tion, and interpretation
2.2.1 Defining investment herding
Empirically, the herd behavior, or co-movement, among a group of firms can be
defined as a correlation between individual firms’ behaviors and the group pattern.
Specifically, this study defines investment herding as the co-movement or correlation
between the industry-level investment changes and firms’ investment changes.
There are several motivations for this choice. First, firms, like individuals, can
herd on many behaviors other than investment, but the economic implication of in-
vestment herding is significant and widely discussed, which connects our study to a
broader literature. More importantly, as mentioned before, theories have contradic-
tory predictions regarding the relationship between the CEO’s equity compensation
and investment herding. Our choice provides a rare opportunity to test the theories.
9For example, Badertscher, et al. (2013), Kaustia & Rantala (2015), Leary & Roberts (2014),
and Grundy & Li (2010).
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Second, unfortunately, theories do not suggest a unique definition or measure
of investment herding, and different definitions can have diverse interpretations and
implications.10 We choose to focus on the co-movement between firm and industry
investment changes, because we want to capture the responsiveness of the individual
firm to the industry-level pattern, which reflects an essentially dynamic aspect of
herding. We argue that herding means different firms follow others’ behaviors in a
dynamic sense (as you increase investments, I increase investment too), rather than
different firms become the same type at a steady state (like we all invest at the
same amount). In contrast, some studies employ measures of the differences between
individual firms and the industry, or the degree of uniformity/diversity among firms,
which are more the results of the processes rather than the firm-industry interactions
that we want to understand.
Third, we measure the investment change by computing the change in the capital
expenditure-to-total assets ratios of two successive years.11 We do not argue that
our measure is the only nor the best one for investment herding. Besides, while this
ratio is conventional and widely used in the literature, different types of investments
(like financial or non-financial) and various shocks on asset values can affect the ratio
in complex ways. A further decomposition is possible but beyond the scope of this
paper.
2.2.2 Model specification and interpretation
To investigate the influence, I specify an econometric model in which a set of
variables interacting with the industry-level investment change:
∆Ikjst = αk + β0∆I(k)jt + β1∆I(k)jtXkjst + β2Xkjst
+ β3∆I(k)jtVkjst + β4Vkjst + β5Fjst + γ∆Ikjs,t−1 + εkjst,
(2.1)
10This is partly a reason why studies find different effects of the CEO’s equity compensation on
herd behaviors.
11Capital expenditure includes the funds used for additions to property, plant, and equipment,
excluding amounts arising from acquisitions (for example, fixed assets of purchased companies).
This includes property and equipment expenditures. Total assets include current assets plus net
property, plant, and equipment plus other non-current assets (including intangible assets, deferred
charges, and investments and advances).
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where ∆Ikjst is the change in the investment-to-asset ratio of firm k in industry j in
state s at year t, and ∆Ijt is the industry change in investment ratio in industry j at
year t, excluding firm k. The lagged term of the firm’s investment change, ∆Ikjs,t−1,
is also included. The firm-fixed effects are included in αk. Xkjst denotes manage-
rial compensation structures measured by the equity-to-salary ratio (Equity Ratio).
Vkjst denotes all other factors that might affect the extent of herding, including the
CEO-chair duality, externally-hired CEO, the firm’s age, tangible asset ratio, analyst
forecast coverage, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Fjst are industry-,
state-, year-, and incorporation-state-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
The focus of this study is not on the impact of the CEO’s equity pay on the firm’s
investment, nor on the industry-firm correlation per se, but on the influence of CEO
equity pay on the industry-firm correlation, i.e., does the extent of herding increase
or decrease as the CEO receives more equity-based pay.12 To illustrate, we can take
a partial derivative with respect to ∆Ijt, such that
∂∆Ikjst
∂∆I(k)jt
= β0 + β1Xkjst + β3Vkjst, (2.2)
in which the main effect of the industry’s investments on an individual firm’s invest-
ment, β0, is adjusted by β1Xkjst and β3Vkjst. In the following analyses, the estima-
tion of β1 is of particular interest, indicating the impact of equity-based pay on the
co-movement or herd relationship between ∆Ikjst of the firm and ∆Ijt of the indus-
try. The result can be counted as evidence for the information-based (compensation-
based) hypothesis, if the coefficient β1 is significant and negative (positive).
2.3 Data, variables, and summary statistics
2.3.1 Data sources
In the following analyses, I collect data of firms’ investments and other information
from CRSP-Compustat Merged database (Compustat). Compustat provides balance
sheet and other financial information for publicly-traded firms in the U.S., which are
collected from firms’ annual reports and other filings to the SEC. The data is then
12This framework also helps to resolve the so-called “spurious herding” issue, i.e., the difficulty
in distinguishing between the common condition-driven herding and the firm-specific factor-driven
herding (Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000).
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matched with CEOs’ information collected from Execucomp, which contains detailed
information of top executives’ compensations, such as salary, bonus, pension, stock
award and stock option, and personal characteristics such as gender and age, that are
collected from firms’ annual proxy reports (DEF14A SEC form). The information of
analysts’ coverage is collected from the Thomson Reuters IBES database and matched
with the CEO-firm data set. The final sample contains 2,689 firms and 32,520 firm-
year observations, covering publicly traded firms in the U.S. economy over the period
1992-2016.
2.3.2 Measurements of variables and summary statistics
The outcome variable is the change in the investment-to-asset ratio of the firm,
∆IF for simplicity. Investment is measured by the sum of tangible (capital expen-
diture) and intangible (R&D) investments divided by total assets. A lagged term of
the firm’s investment change, ∆IFt−1, is included to control for the autocorrelation
between the firm’s investments in successive periods.
Due to the uncertainty about the precise target for each firm, this study computes
three industry-level investment changes, the industry-median, the industry-average,
and the industry-leader, and investigate which one correlates more strongly with
firms’ investment changes. The industry-median investment change is defined as the
median investment change within the industry-year, calculated excluding the focal
firm. The industry-average investment change is defined as the average investment
change within the industry-year, calculated excluding the focal firm. The industry-
leader investment change is defined as the average investment changes of the top
tercile of firms (by sales share) in the industry-year. These top-tercile firms are
excluded when running regressions using the industry-leader investment change as
∆IInd. All three industry-level investment-to-asset ratios are defined at the three-
digit SIC level. Investment herding is then captured by the correlation between ∆IF
and ∆IInd.
To capture the relative importance of equity-based pay to the manager, I measure
CEO’s compensation structure by the equity-to-salary ratio, Equity Ratio, which is
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defined as the sum of stock awards and stock options values divided by the value of
salary.13
The relationship between CEO compensation structure and the firm-industry in-
vestment co-movement is likely to be influenced by many other factors. Based on
the theory and the empirical literature, this study controls for CEO-chair duality,
External CEO, Analyst forecast coverage, Tangible asset ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman
index, and Firm’s age, by generating respective interaction terms with the industry-
level investment change, ∆IInd.
Aside from the compensation structures, previous studies based on the principal-
agent framework suggested that managers’ powers in controlling firms vis-à-vis share-
holders are relevant to the firm-industry investment co-movements (Knyazeva, et al.,
2008) and strategy choices (Carpenter, 2000; Tang, et al., 2011). I include two binary
variables to proxy for the managers’ controlling powers: CEO-chair duality and the
External CEO. If the CEO is also the board chair, the check and balance functions
of the board is weakened, giving the CEO more discretionary power. The externally
hired CEO indicates to whether the CEO is hired from outside three years before
he/she becomes the CEO. An internally-promoted CEO may have more connections
and influences among his or her coworkers, while an externally-hired CEO may rely
more on shareholders’ supports.
Analyst forecast coverage is measured as the log of the number of one-year-ahead
analyst EPS forecasts, using the data from the Thomson Reuters IBES database.
Knyazeva, et al. (2008) find that when a firm receives more financial analysts’ earning-
per-share (EPS) forecasts, the firm tends to herd less. They suggest that analysts’
forecasts provide information about the market and the firm, which reduces the asym-
metric information problem between shareholders and the manager, and therefore less
room for managerial shirking.
Tangible asset ratio is defined as property, plants and equipment divided by total
assets. Knyazeva, et al. (2008) find that firms with more tangible assets tend to herd
more, but the underlying cause is hard to pin down.
13In calculating the values of equity-based pays, I use the standard Black-Scholes/fair-value mea-
sures to represent the ex ante evaluations of compensation values at the beginning of a business
year when executives plan their work. They are also more available through the whole period, and
widely used in the literature.
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Firm’s age is measured as the years the firm existed in Compustat database.
Older firms should accumulate more firm-specific information from experiences and
have stable growth paths, and therefore herd less.
As competition intensifies, firms need to study more firm-specific information
to survive, and therefore may reduce the firm-industry co-movement. To measure
the extent of market competition, I compute Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) at
the SIC 3-digit industry level based on Compustat database. A higher HHI implies
higher-level of concentration and lower-level of competition.
In addition to these variables that interact with the industry-level investment
change, this paper includes a set of controlling variables and fixed effects controlling
for other factors. We include the number of employees controlling for the firm’s size,
and the lagged term of the return on assets for the firm’s profitability. We control for
firm-, state-, industry- and year-fixed effects throughout the firm-level analyses. We
also include the incorporation state where the firm incorporates and interact it with
years, controlling for the variation of regulations like anti-takeover acts (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 1999 & 2003). This paper reports robust standard errors adjusted for

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We first compare among three industry-level targets to see which one relates to
firms’ investments more. We estimate a simplified version of Equation (2.1) which
includes the main explanatory variable, CEO equity-based pay ratio, and controls for
basic characteristics of the sample, including the firm’s investment change last year,
return on assets last year, the number of the firm’s employees, and four fixed effects.
Table 2.2 reports the results, in which Column (1), (2), and (3) are the results us-
ing, respectively, the industry-median, the industry-average, and the industry-leader
investment changes as the ∆IInd. The effect of the industry-median is stronger than
the other two in Table 1, and the gap becomes wider after including other controlling
variables, as shown in Table 2.6 in Appendix A.1.14 Based on these results, we use
the industry-median investment change as the ∆IInd in the following analyses.
14The comparison reveals that firms’ herding targets are not random but affected by certain
structures. However, the investigation of these structures is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 2.2. Effects of Equity-Based Pay on Investment Herding (Non-Financial
Firms): Comparing Three Targets
Dependent Variable: Firm’s Investment Change (∆IF )
Industry-Median Industry-Average Industry-Leader
(1) (2) (3)
Industry investment change (∆IInd) 0.439*** -0.000 0.090***
(0.112) (0.000) (0.029)
CEO equity-based pay ratio × ∆IInd 0.033** 0.000 0.008
(0.019) (0.000) (0.006)
CEO equity-based pay ratio -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager characteristics and interac-
tions
No No No
Firm characteristics and interactions No No No
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and inter-
actions
No No No
∆IFt−1 Yes Yes Yes
Return on assets last year Yes Yes Yes
Number of employees Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation-state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.303 0.305
Observations 32,520 32,520 29,261
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,640
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP-Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Investment changes are measured by the difference
between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the last period. In
Column (1), the industry investment change is industry-median investment change calculated excluding the focal
firm. In Column (2), the industry investment change is industry-average investment change calculated excluding the
focal firm. In Column (3), the industry investment change is industry-leader investment change, which is defined as
the average investment changes of top tercile of firms (by sales share) in the industry. These top-tercile firms are
excluded from regressions in Column (3). Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. Equity based pay ratio is
defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
After identifying the co-movement between the industry-median and the firms’
investments changes, we focus on the effect of equity-based pay on the industry-firm
investment co-movement. In Table 2.3 Column (1), we repeat the basic findings in
Table 2.2 Column (1). Then we include other variables that might also affect the
industry-firm investment co-movement in three steps. In Column (2), we include two
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variables controlling for managerial characteristics: whether the CEO is also the chair
of the board (CEO-chair duality), and whether the CEO joins the firm within three
years before becoming the CEO (External CEO). In Column (3), we include variables
controlling for firm and industry characteristics: tangible asset ratio, analyst forecast
coverage, firm’s age, and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Finally, in Column (4),
we include all controlling variables.
Before discussing the effect of equity-based pay on the industry-firm investment
co-movement, we first look at the co-movement itself, which is shown in the coefficient
of the industry-median investment change (∆IInd). In Table 2.3, the coefficients are
consistently positive and statistically significant through Column (1) to (4), while
the magnitude increases when including more variables. The results in Column (4)
implies that an increase in the industry-median investment change by one unit is
associated with one unit increase in the firm’s investment change, all else equal.
Next, we focus on the effects of equity-based pay. From Column (1) to (4),
the coefficient of the interaction term between CEO equity-based pay ratio and the
industry-median investment change remains positive and statistically significant, and
the magnitude ranges between 0.032 and 0.036. This implies that, at the average level
of equity-based pay ratio, 3.321, the extent of industry-firm investment co-movement
will be strengthened by 0.1 unit, which is about 10% of the co-movement magnitude
in Column (4). This economically sizeable effect is in line with the prediction of the
compensation-based theory.
Several variables that might affect the co-movement also show significant effects.
Based on the results in Column (4), if the CEO is also the board chair, the industry-
firm co-movement will reduce by 36%. Interestingly, this seems different from the
finding of Knyazeva, et al. (2008) in which more entrenched the CEO is, the lower
propensity of the firm to co-move. In contrast, if the tangible asset ratio is at its
average level, 0.539, the co-movement will increase by 41%, which is in line with
Knyazeva, et al. (2008). Column (4) also shows that in line with our predictions, if
HHI is at its average level, the co-movement will decrease by 33%; and if the firm’s
age is at its average level, 25, the co-movement will decrease by 28%.
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Table 2.3. Effects of Equity-Based Pay on Investment Herding (Non-Financial
Firms)
Outcome Variable: Firm’s Investment Ratio Change (∆IF )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry-median investment change (∆IInd) 0.439*** 0.542*** 0.935** 1.008***
(0.112) (0.123) (0.367) (0.365)
CEO equity-based pay ratio × ∆IInd 0.033* 0.036** 0.033* 0.032*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
CEO-chair duality × ∆IInd -0.462** -0.358**
(0.182) (0.156)
External CEO × ∆IInd 0.612 0.460
(0.416) (0.361)
Tangible asset ratio × ∆IInd 0.842*** 0.765***
(0.208) (0.187)
Analyst forecast coverage × ∆IInd -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
Herfindahl-Hirschman index × ∆IInd -0.00022*** -0.00021***
(0.00005) (0.00005)
Firm’s age × ∆IInd -0.012*** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004)
CEO equity-based pay ratio -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO-chair duality -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
External CEO 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Tangible asset ratio -0.001 -0.002
(0.023) (0.023)
Analyst forecast coverage -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm’s age 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆IFt−1 -0.659*** -0.658*** -0.655*** -0.655***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.168) (0.168)
Return on assets last year 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Number of employees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm-, industry-, and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation-state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.305 0.307 0.308
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Firm’s investment changes (∆IF ) are measured by the
difference between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the last
period. Industry-median investment change (∆IInd) is measured by the median investment change in the industry
excluding the focal firm. Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. CEO Equity based-pay ratio is defined as the
value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. CEO-chair is a binary variable indicating
whether the CEO is also the chair of the board. External CEO is a binary variable indicating whether the CEO
joins the firm within three years before becoming the CEO. Tangible asset ratio is property, plants and equipment
divided by total assets. Analyst forecast coverage is log of the number of one-year-ahead analyst EPS forecasts.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is computed at the 3-digit SIC level. Firm’s age is the number of years the firm
entered in Compustat. Return on assets last year is one-year lag of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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2.4 Identification strategy
In the OLS analyses, an endogeneity concern can arise because, for example,
the firm planning to follow certain investment fashions may need to provide more
incentives for the incumbent manager. Or, a technological change may affect both
the firm’s investments and the CEO’s compensation structure. It’s also likely that the
firms herding on investments may herd on other corporate policies as well, including
the CEO’s compensation structure.15 To examine whether the correlation means
causation, we need to identify a change in the managerial compensation structure
that is unrelated to the industry-firm investment change.
2.4.1 Identification strategy: Internal Revenue Code 162(m)
A corporate tax policy change seems to be the natural candidate for the needed in-
strument. Enacted by Congress in 1993, section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code
limits the deductibility of top five executives’ non-performance-related compensations
over $1 million, and imposes a 60% federal surtax on salaries above $1 million. In this
way, the legislation encourages firms to increase the use of performance pay rather
than fixed salary while leaving open the total amounts of compensations. Respond-
ing to the legislation, several studies had found that firms originally paying higher
salaries reduce salaries to $1 million, and firms originally paying lower raise salaries
over time but don’t go above $1 million (Perry & Zenner, 2001; Rose & Wolfram,
2002). At the same time, the growth of the total amounts of CEO compensation has
been unaffected. Firms increase other forms of compensations instead of salary, such
that the structure of executive compensation has became more equity-based (Perry
& Zenner, 2001; Balsam & Ryan, 2007).
Given these findings, if we range firms by their CEOs’ salaries, we would expect
to see firms crowding around the tax deductibility threshold, one million dollars.
In addition, as the total compensation keeps growing, the number of firms crowded
around the threshold should increase over time. As shown in Figure 2.1, there is
indeed a significant, abnormal bunch of firms paying CEOs’ salaries right at the
threshold, implying that many firms are affected by the legislation and freeze CEOs’
salaries at the threshold. Figure 2.2 shows that the bunch grows higher over time
15Please see Clifford (2017) for real-world observations that boards indeed herd in determining
CEOs’ compensations.
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as the whole distribution gradually shifts rightward, suggesting that more and more
firms freeze CEO’s salaries around the threshold. In this case, as firms try to pay
their CEOs more over time, they are more likely to do so by raising performance pay
especially the equity-based pay, and we should see an increase in the equity-to-salary
ratio as a result.
Figure 2.1. The bunching distribution of firms by CEO’s salary, whole sample period
(1992-2016)
However, the IRC Section 162(m) is not a strict ban, and firms can choose how
or whether to respond. In this case, the treatment effect of Section 162(m) on firms’
decisions is not a sharp discontinuity at the $1 million dollars salary threshold, but
works more in the way of a probability over a certain range of CEOs’ salaries and
leads to the bunching of firms around the threshold. As this policy was enacted in
1993, on the one hand, all firms originally above the $1 million salary threshold would
be affected. They are likely to reduce the salaries to the threshold or st least stop
salaries from growing. On the other hand, firms originally below the threshold could
be affected as well such that they might freeze salaries before hitting the threshold.
We therefore expect that both firms close to and above the threshold are affected.


















































remains uncertain. We therefore try different treatment bounds in the following
analyses.
Based on the above considerations, we construct out instrumental variable by in-
cluding a binary variable indicating whether the CEO’s salary falls into the treatment
range since 1994, and a variable for the CEO’s salary level, together as our instru-
mental variables to capture the change in CEO’s Equity Ratio. Since the tax policy
and whether a CEO’s salary falls into the treatment range are exogenously deter-
mined and orthogonal to firm and industry investments, we argue that our binary
variable satisfies the exclusion restriction of instrumental variable. In addition, since
salary as a non-performance pay is typically disconnected from the firm or industry
investments, and remains a relatively small part of a CEO’s total compensation, we
argue that the salary level variable satisfies the exclusion restriction as well.
2.4.2 Model specification
We estimate a two-stage-least-square model in which the first stage is:
Xkjst = α + η11Zkt + η12∆IjtZkt
+ η13∆Ijt + η14∆IjtVkjst + η15Vkjst + η16Fjst + η17∆Ikjs,t−1 + εkjst,
(2.3)
and
∆IjtXkjst = α + η21Zkt + η22∆IjtZkt
+ η23∆Ijt + η24∆IjtVkjst + η25Vkjst + η26Fjst + η27∆Ikjs,t−1 + εkjst,
(2.4)
where Zkt includes the binary variable indicating whether it’s after 1994 and above
certain lower bounds of the salary, and a salary level variable. The definitions of other
variables are the same as in Equation (2.1).
The second stage is:
∆Ikjst = αk + β0∆Ijt + β1 ̂∆IjtXkjst + β2X̂kjst
+ β3∆IjtVkjst + β4Vkjst + β5Fjst + γ∆Ikjs,t−1 + εkjst,
(2.5)
where ̂∆IjtXkjst and X̂kjst are the fitted values from the first-stage regressions using
our instruments.
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2.4.3 IV estimation results
The results of IV estimation are reported in Table 2.4 and 2.5.16 In Table 2.4 and
2.5, we try different lower bounds of salary from Column (1) to (5). For example,
Column (1) shows the results using a lower bound of 750 thousand dollars, in which
the binary variable indicates whether the observation is after 1994 and has a salary
above 750 thousand dollars.
Our instruments show expected signs in the first stage estimation. In terms of
the first endogenous variable, the treatment range dummy is associated with a higher
CEO equity-to-salary ratio. For the second endogenous variable, the interaction term
between CEO equity ratio and the industry-median investment change, the interac-
tion term between the treatment dummy and the industry-median investment change
also shows a positive correlation. These results confirm our prior that the IRC 162(m)
induced firms to raise equity-to-salary ratio. In addition, the magnitude and statisti-
cal significance decrease when the lower bound of treatment moves up, and the effects
of our instruments tend to peak around the salary bound of 850 thousand dollars,
which verifies our intuition that firms may stop increasing salary before hitting the
threshold.
We further check test statistics to diagnose weak instrument issues. In the first
stage, we check Angrist-Pischke F-test, which is to test whether one of the endogenous
regressors is under- or weakly identified (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). The p-values of
Angrist-Pischke F-tests indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that one of our
endogenous variables is weakly identified. In the second stage, we check Cragg-Donald
and Kleibergen-Paap tests and comparing the F-statistics with the Stock-Yogo (2005)
weak identification test critical values, which are 11.04 at the 5% maximal IV relative
bias and 16.87 at the 10% maximal IV size. Based on the tests, we conclude the
results in Column (2) to be the most reliable ones.
In the second stage, interestingly, our IV estimation shows that a higher CEO
equity ratio will lead to less herding, which is opposite to the finding based on the
OLS analyses. Based on the results shown in the Table 2.5 Column (2), while the
magnitude of industry-firm investment co-movement is 2.25, i.e., an unit increase in
the industry-median investment change is associated with 2.25 unit increase in the
16We report the results using LIML estimator rather than 2SLS as Table 2.7 in Appendix A.2,
which are almost identical to Table 2.4 and 2.5.
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firm’s investment change, the co-movement magnitude will be reduced by 0.93 unit
(about 41%) if the CEO’s equity ratio is at the average level. This finding is consistent
with the the information-based theory.
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Table 2.4. Evidence on Causality: IV Estimation (2SLS), First-Stage Results
Treatment range 750- 850- 950- 1050- 1150-
($Salary, thousand dollars) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Stage Endogenous variable 1: CEO equity ratio
Treatment range dummy 0.814*** 0.973*** 0.081*** 0.693*** 0.419**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.12) (0.147) (0.172)
Salary -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treatment range dummy × ∆IInd -0.41 8.171 3.793 4.703 5.641
(6.421) (6.865) (7.558) (7.891) (8.826)
Salary × ∆IInd 0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 20.431 29.341 17.662 9.983 4.26
p-value of Angrist-Pischke F-test 4.34e-13 1.16e-18 2.37e-11 1.53e-06 0.00521
Endogenous variable 2: CEO equity ratio × ∆IInd
Treatment range dummy -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salary 4.54e-07 -2.53e-07 -2.09e-07 1.25e-07 1.93e-07
(9.09e-07) (9.25e-07) (9.32e-07) (9.06e-07) (9.20e-07)
Treatment range dummy × ∆IInd 0.726** 0.626* 0.54 0.658 0.495
(0.312) (0.344) (.377) (0.433) (0.464)
Salary × ∆IInd 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Angrist-Pischke F statistic 6.970 6.481 5.878 5.534 4.859
p-value of Angrist-Pischke F-test 0.00011 0.00023 0.00054 0.00087 0.00225
Controlling Variables
Manager characteristics and interac-
tions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆IFt−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of employees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Return of assets last year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry- and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689
Robust S.E. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered at firms.
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Firm’s investment changes (∆IF ) are measured by
the difference between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the
last period. Industry-median investment change (∆IInd) is measured by the median investment change in the
industry excluding the focal firm. Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. CEO Equity based-pay ratio is defined
as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. From Column (1) to (5), the treatment
ranges are 750 and above, 850 and above, 950 and above, 1050 and above, and 1150 and above, in thousand dollars.
Manager characteristics include: CEO-chair duality and externally-hired CEO. Firm characteristics includes:
tangible asset ratio, analyst forecast coverage, firm’s age. All controlling variables are the same as in OLS analyses
except the firm-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 2.5. Evidence on Causality: IV Estimation (2SLS), Second-Stage Results
Treatment range 750- 850- 950- 1050- 1150-
($Salary, thousand dollars) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Second Stage Dependent variable: Firm’s investment change (∆IF )
CEO equity ratio × ∆IInd -0.249** -0.281** -0.319** -.307** -0.338**
(0.115) (0.124) (0.134) (0.134) (0.15)
∆IInd 2.105*** 2.254*** 2.409*** 2.356*** 2.471***
(0.616) (0.635) (0.685) (0.686) (0.755)
CEO equity ratio 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 33.431 39.8 25.968 16.63 8.585
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 15.336 22.346 13.362 7.449 3.165
Controlling Variables
Manager characteristics and interac-
tions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆IFt−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of employees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Return of assets last year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry- and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689
Robust S.E. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered at firms.
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Firm’s investment changes (∆IF ) are measured by
the difference between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the
last period. Industry-median investment change (∆IInd) is measured by the median investment change in the
industry excluding the focal firm. Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. CEO Equity based-pay ratio is defined
as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. From Column (1) to (5), the treatment
ranges are 750 and above, 850 and above, 950 and above, 1050 and above, and 1150 and above, in thousand dollars.
Manager characteristics include: CEO-chair duality and externally-hired CEO. Firm characteristics includes:
tangible asset ratio, analyst forecast coverage, firm’s age. All controlling variables are the same as in OLS analyses
except the firm-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
2.5 Conclusion
The causes of the herd behaviors when facing uncertainty have been puzzling
researchers. Based on the views of Keynes (1936; 1937) and the recent analyses
of the effects of the CEO’s compensation structure, the information-based theory
suggests that more equity-based pay will induce the CEO to concentrate on the
firm-specific information and decrease investment herding, while the compensation-
based theory suggest that more equity-based pays will make the CEO concern his/her
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reputation and stock wealth and increase investment herding. This paper provides a
rare opportunity to examine these two theories on the same ground using a sample
of the U.S. non-financial firms over the period of 1992-2016. By analyzing the causal
effect of the CEO’s equity-based pay on investment herding, we find that an increase in
the CEO’s equity-based pay relative to salary leads to a decrease in the co-movement
between the firm’s and the industry-median investments.
While our finding is consistent with the information-based theory, this is by no
mean the final word that can be said on this issue. Other aspects of the issue,
such as the relationship between the reduction in herding and other consequences of
equity-based pay, the impact on firm performance, or the potential difference between
financial and non-financial sectors, deserve careful investigation in the future.
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CHAPTER 3
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 From shareholder wealth maximization to welfare maximization
Milton Friedman (1970) famously argued that a corporate executive should serve
only shareholders’ interests by making as much money as possible, within the limit
of law and custom. While this doctrine of shareholder wealth maximization has been
dominating the discussion of the purpose of the firm, however, there is a growing
discontent with it since studies reveal more and more undesirable consequences.1
To address the problem while preserving shareholder primacy, Hart & Zingales
(2017) present an ambitious proposal. They criticize Friedman (1970) for identifying
shareholder welfare with market value. Combining with insights from behavioral and
social economics, they argue that shareholders, like ordinary people, have ethical
concerns too. These shareholders would like to see the firm they invested in to
address externalities of the firm’s business, just like consumers would like to buy
fair-trade coffee. If the purpose of the firm can be re-defined as shareholder welfare
maximization, rather than wealth maximization, the manager would choose a project
consistent with the shareholder’s ethical preferences and solve the externality problem.
With ethical shareholders in place, shareholder primacy ceases to be the problem but
becomes a force leading to good social outcomes. In this paper, I will call their theory
a Shareholder Democracy (SD) model, which is shareholder primacy at its best.
Does this SD model work? Two sets of questions, both positive and normative,
emerge immediately. While their argument that ordinary shareholders have social
1Including the pay-for-luck phenomenon (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), reducing capital in-
vestment (Lazonick, 2014; Almeida, et al., 2016; Edmans, et al., 2017; Guti’errez & Philippon,
2016), increasing excessive risk-taking (Coles, et al., 2006; Chen, et al., 2006; Pathan, 2009; Bolton,
et al., 2015), and mass layoffs (Jung, 2015 & 2016).
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and ethical concerns is empirically sound, one would wonder why this preference has
not revealed itself more widely in the U.S. economy? After all, even with the hurdle
of the wealth maximization doctrine, given the emphasis of shareholder primacy in
recent decades, we should have had seen more cases of ethical shareholder activism
if the ethical shareholder has always been there. More importantly, instead of the
ordinary, anonymous shareholders in their theory, most social proposals have been
fought for by union and public pension funds.2 This raises an interesting question
because these labor-affiliated shareholders are often said to pursue private interests
“under the guise of ethical behaviors” and ought to be dismissed. Can the ethical
shareholder activism persists if we keep away the labor-affiliated shareholder?
From the normative perspective, when Hart & Zingales (2017) legitimize share-
holders’ social preferences, which is a progress in the direction of democracy, they
inevitably open the door for all types of private interests which deviate from the ab-
stract law of profit maximization of the firm as social preferences do. After all, social
preferences often intertwine with private interests and the distinction between them
is far from clear. For example, the environmental concern is fundamentally driven by
the interest of self-preservation, and the care about local community may come from
the benefits of personal reputation and friendships with your neighbors. Under the
framework of shareholder primacy, what’s the basis on which to favor shareholders’
social preferences but dismiss other private interests?
With these questions in mind, this paper investigates the implications and lim-
itations of the SD model in Hart & Zingales (2017). I points out that the main
difference between Hart & Zingales (2017) and Friedman (1970) is less about whether
shareholders have social preferences, but more about whether those social preferences
should be a legitimate element of the objective of the firm. By legitimizing the role
of social preferences while arbitrarily dismissing “private interests”, Hart & Zingales
(2017) open a space for, but fail to establish, a political theory of the firm.
I further argue that their SD model ignores the heterogeneity among shareholders
and the resulting managerial incentive problem. Once we take these factors into
account, my analysis shows that the SD model either is ineffective in inducing a
2Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) report that these two investor types sponsored 38% of all Rule
14a-8 shareholder proposals in the 1996 to 2005 period, while Georgeson (2012) reports that they
sponsored 47.2% of shareholder proposals in the 2012 proxy season.
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socially good outcome, or can achieve it only through the participation of the type of
shareholders that the SD model wants to dismiss.
Specifically, besides the ethical shareholder, I emphasize that there are at least
two other types of shareholders which have been very active in the U.S. economy: the
homo-economicus shareholder which cares only about financial returns, and the labor-
affiliated shareholder, represented by union and public pension fund shareholders, who
show stronger social and ethical concerns. Each types of shareholders would press
the manager to choose a business model it preferred: while the homo-economicus
shareholder prefers a wealth-maximizing model, the ethical and the labor-affiliated
types prefer a social welfare-maximizing model. The choice of the manager depends on
his/her financial rewards from these two business models, where a wealth-maximizing
model pays the manager higher than a welfare-maximizing model does, and also on
the different disutilities caused by the pressures from different types of shareholders.
My population game analysis shows that once we allow the homo-economicus
shareholder to co-exist with the ethical shareholder within the firm, the manager is
likely to choose a wealth-maximizing business model which gives him/her a higher
reward, even after accounting for the pressure from the ethical shareholder, unless
the fraction of the ethical shareholder is unrealistically high. This suggests that the
SD model is not very effective in inducing the manager to choose an ethical business
model. Next, once three types of shareholders co-exist as they do in many real-world
cases, the pressure from the labor-affiliated shareholder will not only increase the
likelihood of the manager in choosing an ethical business model, but also marginalize
or replace the ethical shareholder, since the former gains higher utility from the
socially good outcomes than the later. This is consistent with the evidence that most
social proposals have been coming from labor-affiliated shareholders, implying that a
shareholder democracy cannot sustain itself without the involvement of stakeholders
or the “special interest” shareholders that the proponents of the SD model try to
dismiss.
In sum, my analyses show that the SD model, while reflecting a progress be-
yond Friedman (1970), is either ineffective or self-defeating. The non-special inter-
est, ethical shareholders remain mostly absent because they are likely to be either
outweighed by the homo-economicus ones because the manager prefers a wealth-
maximizing model, or to be replaced by the labor-affiliated ones because the labor-
affiliated shareholders would fight for the ethical outcomes more strongly than the
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ethical shareholders. Targeting at the labor-affiliated shareholders will decrease rather
than increase the number and the effectiveness of shareholder social proposals. The
effects of several types of policies on the ethical shareholder activism are also dis-
cussed.
3.1.2 Relation to literature
This paper relates to several issues in the literature. First, an enduring theme
in the corporate governance literature is the principal-principal conflict. Although
the literature tends to associate this problem with non-U.S. economies (La Porta, et
al., 1999; Young, et al., 2008) or with the stakeholder model3 (Jensen, 2001; Tirole,
2001), shareholder heterogeneity is actually omnipresent.4 This paper shows that this
problem is also unavoidable in the SD model proposed by Hart & Zingales (2017),
and it deserves careful considerations by reformists to make a progress.
Second, by introducing the labor-affiliated shareholder, this paper relates to the
literature on union and public pension funds. After early speculations such as Drucker
(1976) and Rifkin & Barber (1978), there is a growing empirical literature document-
ing the structures and effects of these labor-affiliated shareholders, including rich
observations by legal scholars and activists.5 This paper is a first step to build a
more realistic theory consistent with the findings from these empirical studies.
Third, there are several models studying the survival and dynamics of socially
concerned firms, such as Kopel et al. (2014), Allen et al. (2015), and Magill et al.
(2015). They all treat governance and control of the socially concerned firms as given
and do not analyze the within-firm conflicts among different types of shareholders
and managers. By explicitly analyzing these aspects, this paper is a complement to
this literature.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I
explain the implications of Hart & Zingales (2017) by comparing their proposal to
3For examples of stakeholder theory, see Freeman (1984), Hill & Jones (1992), and Blair & Stout
(1999). For a detailed literature review, see Williams (2018).
4For example, see Hoskisson, et al. (2002), Gaspar, et al. (2005), Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach
(2008), Hayden & Bodie (2008), Deng, et al. (2013), Clifford & Lindsey (2016), Jacob & Michaely
(2017), and Chen, et al. (2019).
5For example, see Ghilarducci (1992), Fung, et al. (2001), Webber (2018), Jacoby (2020), Agrawal
(2012), Andonov, et al. (2018), and Matsusaka, et al. (2019).
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Friedman (1970), and connecting their treatment of special interests to the literature.
Section 3.3 develops a population game model to analyze the limitations of the SD
model. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Putting Hart & Zingales (2017) in context
3.2.1 Legitimizing social preferences
The main thrust of Hart & Zingales (2017) is incorporating shareholders’ social
preferences into the objective of the firm: wherever shareholders want the firm’s
behaviors to be aligned with their social concerns, the shareholder primacy framework
will naturally lead the firm to maximize shareholder welfare rather than wealth. They
further argue that this incorporation is necessary to address many negative externality
issues, because profit and damage are often inextricably connected, and there may be
no efficient way for ethical shareholders to reverse or compensate for the consequences.
While their approach has merit in reforming the shareholder primacy framework
from within, one may question if they have successfully moved beyond the dominant
paradigm instead of avoiding tough issues. In so far as the dominant paradigm is
concerned, the existence of shareholders’ social and ethical concerns has been well
recognized. Friedman (1970) particularly was fully aware of this fact, but argued
against incorporating these concerns into the objective of the firm for a reason only
partially addressed by Hart & Zingales (2017). To Friedman (1970), as long as the
social concern is not shared by all shareholders and stakeholders, exercising social
responsibility is to get “some stockholders (or customers or employees) to contribute
against their will to social causes favored by activists”. This decision is equivalent to
“imposing taxes and spending the proceeds” which are fundamentally political. In the
usual democratic process, a political process requires check and balance to function
properly. A firm, however, lacks institutions to ensure such checks and balances,
and therefore the incorporation of social preferences should be rejected. Apparently,
Friedman is willing to sacrifice shareholder primacy to avoid the trouble of corporate
governance politics, resorting to the abstract doctrine of wealth maximization.
Upholding the principle of shareholder primacy, Hart and Zingales accepted the
political aspect of exercising corporate social responsibility and suggested using share-
holder votes to aggregate individual preferences, as in the usual democratic process.
In this way, Hart & Zingales (2017) legitimized the role of social preferences. This
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is only a partial solution, however, because although voting is naturally associated
with aggregating diversified preferences, they still treated voters as having the same
preferences and ignored the heterogeneity among shareholders in their model. Their
incomplete contract approach has freed them from this omission, but yet they seems to
be reluctant to go forward in that direction. In consequence, as will be shown in Sec-
tion 3.3, the heterogeneity among shareholders introduces a type of principal-principal
conflict,6 rather than the usual principal-agent conflict, which severely weakens the
power of ethical shareholders under realistic conditions.
3.2.2 A strange case of “special interests”
Moreover, this principal-principal conflict involves not only the tension between
ethical shareholders and homo-economicus shareholders, but also the tension between
ethical shareholders and labor-affiliated shareholders which is usually viewed as share-
holders of “special interests”.
Interestingly, although widely used in the literature, the meaning of special inter-
ests is not clearly defined. To Friedman (1970), as we have seen above, any interest
that is not shared by all shareholders is a special interest. Shareholder wealth maxi-
mization should be used as a kind of second best choice, since Friedman believed that
there is no proper way to deal with the principal-principal conflict within the firm.
Many of Friedman’s followers, however, treat this second best choice as the primary
criterion and any non-profit maximizing concern as a special interest. A general term,
“shareholder value”, is often applied to all shareholders without considering the pos-
sibility that profit maximization may not be a goal shared by all shareholders. For
example, Agrawal (2012) attacked union shareholders for putting members’ interests
above the shareholder value which he defined as the maximum of equity prices. The
position of Hart & Zingales (2017) on this issue is ambiguous at best. They challenged
Friedman (1970) and his followers by legitimizing social preferences but still insisted
to fence off other special-interest behaviors “under the guise of ethical behavior”.
This makes the definition of special interests more obscure.
One alternative to this problem is to follow a tradition in the legal profession ac-
knowledging that all shareholders, individual or institutional, have special interests,
6In the corporate governance literature, the most typical principal-principal conflict is the conflict
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta, et al., 1999).
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let alone the management. While homo-exonomicus shareholders may prefer short-
term profit over long-term growth and ignore externalities, labor-affiliated sharehold-
ers may care more about employees and the community. In fact, due to their willing-
ness to challenge the management, Labor-affiliated shareholders have been the very
active on many issues of corporate governance reforms that benefit all investors, such
as say on pay, enhancing proxy access, fighting accounting frauds, or splitting the
CEO / chair of the board of directors roles (Ertimur, et al., 2011; Renneboog and
Szilagyi, 2010; Georgeson, 2012; Webber, 2018). According to this tradition, the
proper approach is to make investors aware of the diverse interests when dealing with
each other, and to maintain the bargaining and coalition building processes working
as the usual political competition process (Webber, 2018). Although this alternative
is not perfect,7 it does point out that there is no reason to discriminate particularly
against labor-affiliated shareholders whether accepting social preferences or not.
3.3 Shareholder democracy in a representative firm
3.3.1 Overview of the model: a passive shareholder model
The analysis starts at a passive shareholder model in which shareholders are un-
able to put pressures on the manager. As a result, the manager chooses a business
model maximizing his/her utility while generating social or environmental externali-
ties. This in turn deters those socially conscious shareholders from staying in the firm.
By assuming that shareholders have no way to influence the manager’s decisions, this
model resembles the basic agency problem that due to the separation between owner-
ship and control, shareholders are not able to monitor the manager effectively, which
then gives rise to various misconducts of the firm.
There are two types of shareholders in this economy: ethical (E-type) shareholders
who care about the social and ecological impacts in addition to financial returns, and
the homo-economicus (H-type) shareholders who care only about financial returns.
These shareholders are matched with the manager in a representative firm which then
executes a production project. In executing the production project, the manager can
choose between two business models: a clean model (C) which takes into account the
7One possible concern is that this principal-principal conflict makes the manager unaccountable
for he/she can use one task against another (Tirole, 2001), which in turn provides a reason of paying
the manager fixed wages (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991) to deal with this multi-task problem.
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social and environmental externalities, and a dirty model (D) which maximizes profit
at all costs. The clean/dirty models here do not confine to projects of environmental
impacts, but synonyms for various projects with good/bad economic, social, and
environmental externalities. The wage to the manager is wc under a C model, or wd
under a D model. In principle, the manager is neutral in terms of business models and
willing to change when better incentives are provided. Since the C model accounts
for externalities while the D model doesn’t, however, the C model tends to generate
lower earnings than the D model. All else equal, even if both C and D models pay
the manager the same fraction of earnings, the manager will be paid more if he/she
chooses a D model, i.e., wc < wd. This is consistent with the fact that it requires
extra pressures of shareholders to elicit ethical behaviors form the manager, and is
also supported by the empirical studies showing that more socially responsible firms
pay their CEOs less (Cai, et al., 2011; Francoeur, et al., 2017).
After executing the production project, shareholders and the manager receive
rewards that vary with the chosen business model and players’ preferences. As shown
in Table 3.1, while the financial return to the H-type shareholders is πc when the
manager chooses a clean business model, or πd when the manager chooses a dirty one,
the E-type shareholders gain or lose an extra amount of utility, x, respectively, in
addition to the financial returns. While the empirical relationship between corporate
social responsibility activities and the firm’s financial accounting performances has
been a hotly debated issue,8 in this paper I follow Hart & Zingales (2017) to assume
a tension between shareholders’ financial rewards and social welfare, i.e., πc ≤ πd,9 to
compare with their results and to make the analysis interesting.




E πc + x, wc πd − x, wd
H πc, wc πd, wd
8For example, the relationship can vary from positive (Lins, et al., 2017; Edmans, 2012) or
negative (Matsusaka, et al., 2019; Krüger, 2015; Wright & Ferris, 1997), to neutral (McWilliams &
Siegel, 2000) or non-linear (Von Arx & Ziegler, 2014).
9Please note that this is not inconsistent with the studies showing stock prices respond positively
to corporate social responsibility activities, because the stock prices in those studies reflect the
mixed evaluations of various types of shareholders, rather than the reward paid by the firm to its
shareholders.
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In this simple model, it’s easy to see that while ethical shareholders would like
to stay in the firm when the probability of the manager choosing C is higher than
50%, the manager will never choose C since wc < wd. That is, the manager always
choose D if shareholders remain passive, and the H-type shareholders can offer a
price acceptable to the E-type shareholders to exit such that the H-type shareholders
prevail.
3.3.2 An active shareholder democracy
The manager will not care about shareholders’ views unless discontented share-
holders can put pressures on the manager. In this context, existing studies tend to
explain misconduct of a firm by the failure of collective actions of its shareholders,
and shareholder primacy is not a problem but rather a solution once ethical share-
holders can act collectively. Moving beyond this view, in the active shareholder model
presented in this and next sections, I follow Hart & Zingales (2017) in assuming no
collective action problem for shareholders, to highlight critical limits of shareholder
democracy. The analysis of this section shows that, even if the E-type shareholders
can act collectively and put pressures on the manager, the effect is severely weakened
by the H-type shareholders’ counter actions. Furthermore, several institutional con-
ditions tilt the balance toward the H-type shareholders. Therefore, simply resorting
to shareholder democracy will not solve the problem of corporate misconducts very
much.
Consider a representative firm of active shareholder model, in which there are two
types of shareholders, E and H. Different from the passive model in Section 3.3.1,
here the E-type shareholders can punish the manager by reducing his/her utility by
the amount of α, if the manager chooses a D model. In a similar fashion, the H-type
shareholders can punish the manager by the amount of β if a C model is chosen.
These settings are consistent with the definition of active shareholders who believe
that engagement is more important and effective than divestment to change a firm’s
behaviors. So the active shareholders will stay in the firm rather than shopping freely
from firm to firm, unless someone offers a price higher than the expected utility.
Let p be the fraction of the E-type shareholders in the firm, and q be the prob-
ability of the manager choosing a C model. Based on the payoff matrix shown in
Table 3.2, the expected payoffs for E-type and H-type shareholders are
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E πc + x, wc πd − x, wd − α
H πc, wc − β πd, wd
V E = (πc + x)q + (πd − x)(1− q),
V H = πcq + πd(1− q),
(3.1)
and the expected payoff for the manager in choosing between C and D models are
V C = wcp+ (wc − β)(1− p),
V D = (wd − α)p+ wd(1− p).
(3.2)
Expected payoffs are further shown in Figure 3.1. For shareholders (right), V E =
πd − x and V H = πd when q = 0, and V E = πc + x and V H = πc when q = 1. For
the manager (right), V C = wc − β and V D = wd when p = 0, and V C = wc and
V D = wd − α when p = 1.
Figure 3.1. Expected payoffs under an active shareholder democracy to shareholders






















On the left side of Figure 3.1, the intersection of V E and V H identifies the critical
value of the probability of the manager choosing C for the E-type shareholder to
survive in the firm. It’s easy to find that q∗ = 1
2
. On the right side of Figure 3.1, the
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intersection of V C and V D identifies the critical fraction of the E-type shareholders
such that C will be the manager’s best response. Solve Equations (3.2) for p, we find:
p∗ =






where 0 < ∆w ≤ α since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and wd > wc.
Compared to the passive shareholder model in the previous section, in this active
shareholder model, there are rooms for shareholders to influence the manager’s choice
of strategy. Therefore, consistent with the shareholder primacy argument, larger the α
and hence larger the p∗, easier for the manager to choose C. However, the shareholder
primacy argument does not account for the fact that the H-type shareholders can act
too, and larger the β, harder for the manager to choose C.
The influence of the E-type shareholders is further constrained by several insti-
tutional conditions such that the value of p∗ is very likely larger than 1
2
. To see
the reasons, we learn from Equation (3.3) that, to have p∗ < 1
2
, we need to have
α > 2∆w + β. That is, the pressure from the E-type shareholders need to be larger
than the pressure from the H-type shareholders plus the gap between the manager’s
compensations from a C and a D models. This is unrealistic because it is likely that
α < β and ∆w > 0.
The relative strengths of α and β depend on not just the likelihoods of collective
actions of the H-type and E-type shareholders, but also on regulation, court decisions,
political influences, and the dominant ideology. Even if we assume no problem in the
collective actions, since the interpretation of shareholder primacy has been dominated
by the proponents of Friedman (1970) in the recent decades, the E-type shareholder
is definitely on the weak side in terms of regulation and court decisions. In terms
of political influence, compared to the powerful lobbies and campaign contributions
from big homo-economicus shareholders (Young, 2012; Epstein, 2019), it’s very rare
to see any meaningful political engagement of ordinary ethical shareholders in the
forms of protest, lobby or campaign contribution. Actually, one can argue that the
ethical shareholder is non-political by definition, otherwise it may well become a type
of special-interest shareholders.
In terms of the dominant ideology, there are some signs that the current is moving
closer to the side of E-type shareholder recently, particularly on the environmental
and sweatshop issues accompanying the fair trade movement. But its influence in
the corporate world is more a combined product of the actions of labor-affiliated
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shareholders and consumers, and singling out and attacking the L-type shareholder
will definitely reduce α.
In terms of ∆w, as mentioned earlier, empirical studies find that socially responsi-
ble firms pay their CEOs less, suggesting ∆w > 0 (Cai, et al., 2011; Francoeur, et al.,
2017). Among different components of the CEO’s compensation, these firms also rely
less on incentive-based compensation ( Francoeur, et al., 2017), which is consistent
with the evidence that equity-based pay can lead to various economic and social prob-
lems.10 As the growth of equity-based pay and performance bonuses pushed up the
total compensation in the recent decades, the gap between wd and wc is far from zero,
which suggests that the influence of the E-type shareholder is seriously weakened.
3.3.3 When “special interest” shareholders matter
While the institutional conditions discussed above impose serious constraints on
the SD model, current regulations do not completely rule out the space for share-
holders’ social proposals or prohibit ethical shareholders. Actually, there have been
rich records of social proposals in the field of corporate governance. However, we
don’t see many ethical shareholders in reality, and most social proposals have been
raised not by the ethical shareholders but by the union and public pension funds, or
the labor-affiliated shareholders (Ertimur, et al., 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010;
George-son, 2012; Webber, 2018). From a positive rather than a normative point of
view, this raises interesting questions about why is this the case and what are its
implications to the SD model.
The explanation provided in this section is straight-forward: compared to the
ethical shareholders, union and public pension funds care more about externalities
because, by definition, they have more at stake in the game, either because they
enjoy some private benefits under a clean model, or because they bear the burden
of externalities under a dirty model. In this case, their pressures for a clean model
outweigh the pressures from ethical shareholders and tend to replace the latter when
a clean model is chosen.
Combined with the analyses of previous sections, one interesting result of this
section is: the non-special interest, ethical shareholders are likely to be squeezed
from both sides and to be replaced either by the shareholders who care only about
10Please see Footnote 1.
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financial returns, or by the shareholders who are concerned more about social wel-
fare/externalities more. This explains the absence of ethical shareholders and the role
of the labor-affiliated shareholders in the current shareholder activism. It also implies
that the attack on the labor-affiliated shareholders will decrease rather than increase
social proposals.
In an extended model of active shareholders, there are three types of shareholders,
E, H, and L. While E and H are defined as the same as in the previous section, L
represents the labor-affiliated shareholders including union and public pension funds,
as shown in Table 3.3. Due to their roles in the production process and in the
community, the L-type shareholders enjoy a private benefit (+y) under a C model
and suffer from the externality (−y) under a D model, which are larger than the
extra utility/disutility of the E-type shareholders under the C/D models (y > x).
As the L-type shareholders have more to gain and to lose, they will protest against
the manager harder than the E-type shareholders if the manager chooses a D model.
This is shown in the disutility, −γ, on the manager’s return wd, and γ > α.





E πc + x, wc πd − x, wd − α
H πc, wc − β πd, wd
L πc + y, wc πd − y, wd − γ
Let q remain the probability of the manager choosing a C model. With the infor-
mation in Table 3.3, we can depict the expected payoffs of three types of shareholders
in the left side of Figure 3.2, where V H is the expected payoff for the H-type share-
holders, V E for the E-type shareholders, and V L for the L-type shareholders. It
shows that while the critical probability of the manager in choosing C remains 1
2
, the
upper envelope of the expected payoff lines is always above V E except at q∗ = 1
2
,
implying that the E-type shareholder is going to be replaced not only by the H-type
if a D model is chosen, but also by the L-type if a C model is chosen. This result
comes from the fact that both the homo-economicus and the labor-affiliated share-
holders have more to gain and lose than the ethical shareholders, albeit for different
reasons. Once we allow the H-type and the L-type shareholders to co-exist with
the E-type shareholders in the model, the E-type shareholders will extinct. It helps
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to explain the puzzle why, despite the plausible assumption of the existence of the
E-type shareholders, we don’t observe them very much in reality.
Figure 3.2. Expected payoffs under an active shareholder democracy to shareholders


























Next, with the result from the left side of Figure 3.2, we can reduce Table 3.3 to
a 2-by-2 matrix by deleting the row of E. Then let p′ be the fraction of the L-type
shareholders, and 1 − p′ be the fraction of the H-type shareholders. The manager’s
expected payoffs in choosing C and D become
V C = (wc − β)(1− p′) + wcp′,
V D = wd(1− p′) + (wd − γ)p′.
(3.4)





Compared with Equation (3.3), since γ > α, we have p′∗ < p∗ as shown in the right
side of Figure 3.2. That is, the critical fraction of the L-type shareholders required to
induce the manager to choose a C model is less than that of the E-type shareholders,
such that a shareholder democracy led by the labor-affiliated shareholders is more
likely to succeed in pushing the manager to change for good, all else equal. This is
consistent with the existence of social proposals given the institutional constraints,
and helps to explain why they mostly come from the union and public pension funds.
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3.4 Conclusion
In challenging the dominant theory of the purpose of the firm, Hart & Zingales
(2017) propose a Shareholder Democracy model in which the doctrine of shareholder
wealth maximization is replaced by shareholder welfare maximization, and ethical
shareholders can express their social concerns through voting. While their model rep-
resents a big progress beyond Friedman (1970), this paper shows that the model does
not immune from the pressures of the homo-economicus shareholders. In addition,
this model is either problematic or self-defeating by introducing social preferences
while fencing off special-interest shareholders, particularly the labor-affiliated share-
holders, because there is no clear distinction between various social preferences and
special interests, and the labor-affiliated shareholders have been on the forefront of
corporate governance reform and have outweighed the effect of ethical shareholders.
Not all private interests are bad. As temporary monopoly rents may stimulate
innovations, the private interests of the labor-affiliated shareholders may have similar
effects in pushing for a more socially inclusive model of corporate governance (Webber,
2018). Such a model is possible if we not only replace wealth maximization with





A.1 Data Sources and Matching
Compustat (North America) & Execucomp are proprietary databases com-
piled by Stansdard & Poors’ for firms traded on a U.S. and Canadian Exchange (we
keep only firms which have their headquarters in the U.S.) and for S&P 1500, from
1992 to present. We obtain the data from the WRDS platform. CPS. The Current
Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 60,000 participating house-
holds, a sample representing the civilian non-institutional U.S. population, conducted
by the U.S. Census Bureau for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The data
of workers come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), or the
“March supplement”, of CPS which is widely used in the literature.
We obtain the data from the IPUMS-CPS program which provides CPS micro-
data since 1960s to present in coherent industry and occupation classification codes.
We use the data ranging from year 1992 to year 2016, and keep only the wage and
salary earners in the private sector. We exclude the executive occupation from the
sample.
All nominal values are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from BLS.
The base year is 2010.
Matching: the firm-level sample. In building the firm-level sample, the merge
between Compustat and Execucomp is based on the GVKEY identifier which is
unique for each firm in both databases.
To match the CPS data to the Compustat-Execucomp data set, we utilize the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. While each observation in the Execu-
comp and Compustat databases contain a SIC code following the classification of the
U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CPS data set does not contain
SIC codes but only the Census 1990 industry code. So we build a crosswalk table to
link the Census 1990 code to the SIC code basing on the appendix A of Scopp (2003),
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so that each observation in the CPS receives a corresponding SIC code. Due to the
changes of categorization over years, the finest level at which the linkage can be made
is the 2-digit SIC level.
The ASEC contains more demographic details than surveys in other months. It
contains detailed information needed for this study, including gender, race, age, em-
ployment status, union membership, education attainment, etc. We calculate the
series of proportions of worker characteristics within every industry-year using CPS
data. The definition of each variable is presented in the summary statistics tables.
The series of proportions are then matched with the Cunpustat-Execucomp data at
the industry-year level.
Since firms in Compustat and Execucomp tend to be big firms, we drop ob-
servations from CPS who worked in small firms (less than 100) when calculating
worker characteristics. We also drop all conglomerate firms (2-digit SIC = 99) from
Compustat-Execucomp data set that are not classifiable to a specific industry.
Matching: the individual-level sample. In building the individual-level sam-
ple, we first calculate firms’ and managers’ compensation structures and other char-
acteristics at the firm-year level, and then take the weighted averages of each at the
2-digit SIC industry level for each industry-year. We use the share of each firm in the
total employees in each industry-year as the weight of each firm and each executive.
Then we use the annual wage and salary income to measure the worker’s wage.
To compute the hourly wage, we divide the annual wage and salary income by the
number of hours worked, which is possible only since the 1976 survey. The data of
extremely high incomes in CPS are subjected to topcoding procedures and therefore
bias downward for confidentiality reasons. To deal with the problem, we multiply top-
coded incomes in the period 1992-1995 by 1.75, following the method of Philippon &
Reshef (2012).
In the individual-level sample, we require the included individual workers, firms,
and managers all to be in big firms, defined as a firm with least 500 employees.
A.2 Measurements of equity-based pay
The information on managerial compensation comes from Execucomp database.
Execucomp provides time series data of managerial compensation since 1992.
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From 1992 to 2005, the value of stock options is measured by S&P’s Black-Scholes-
Merton formula (Execucomp item: option awards blk value). The formula calcu-
lates the expected value of the option accounting for current stock price, exercise
price, discount rate, time to expiration, and the estimated volatility of returns. Since
2006, the values of all equity-based compensations are measured by the estimated
fair value of the awards, as required by the SEC. The fair value is often based on
Black-Scholes or a similar valuation method, and therefore remains consistent with
the evaluation before 2006.
In computing the Equity Fraction measure, we use “Total Compensation 1” (Ex-
ecucomp item: tdc1) to measure the value of total compensation of the manager
between 1992 and 2005. In the cases of missing variables, we use “Total Compensa-
tion 2” (Execucomp item: tdc2), and, if still missing, “Total Current Compensation”
(Execucomp item: total curr). We use the “Total Compensation as Reported in
SEC Fillings” (Execucomp item: total sec) since 2006. This measurement uses
fair-value measures of stock options and stock awards, and is valued at grant-date
stock prices but recorded as compensation expenses only if and when an option or an
award vests, i.e., when the manager is allowed to exercise the options and purchase
the company’s stock.
Hopkins & Lazonick (2016) point out that the conventional measurements of the
value of equity-based pay, using the fair-vale or Black-Scholes method, are much
smaller comparing to the realized values. However, on the one hand, there are signifi-
cant uncertainties regarding the magnitudes of realized values when the compensation
schemes are determined by the board, so that its incentive effects on executives are
ambiguous. On the other hand, the data of realized value become available only since
2006 which will costs us about the half of observations. Therefore, we use conventional
measurements in this study.
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A.3 Robustness tests: sample selection bias using Heckman
correction model (corresp. Section 1.3.3.1)
[This is results from the previous version. Re-estimations are currently underway.]
Table A.1. Evidence on Managerial Incentives and Workers’ Wages, Heckman’s
(1976, 1979) two-step correction model
Dependent Variable: Log(Yearly Average Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO equity-based pay -0.074*** -0.073***
(0.014) (0.020)
Non-CEO equity-based pay -0.083*** -0.093***
(0.022) (0.023)
CEO non-equity performance pay 0.060** 0.012
(0.024) (0.000)
Non-CEO non-equity performance pay 0.027 0.028
(0.030) (0.000)
Incentive-control interaction terms No Yes No Yes
Managers’ shareholdings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Herfindahl-Hirschman index Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation-state-year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,344 9,344 9,344 9,344
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Equity pay fraction is defined as the fraction of stock award plus stock option in the executive total
compensation. Non-equity performance pay fraction is defined as the fraction of bonus + long-term incentive pay till
2005, non-equity incentive pay since 2006, in the executive total compensation. Firm characteristics includes:
foreign activity ratio, log value of sales per employee, log value of asset per employee, leverage ratio. Worker
characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, potential experience and its square term, no union coverage,
full/part-time status, urban residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions at the 2-SIC digit-year level.
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A.4 Robustness Tests: non-finance vs. finance; industry-
year-fixed effects; managerial shareholding (corresp. Sec-
tion 1.3.3.2)
Table A.2. Robustness Tests: Non-financial and financial sectors, industry-Year-
Fixed effects, CEO shareholding. Firm-level sample (corresp. Section 1.3.3.2)
Dependent Variable: Log(Yearly Wage)
Non-finance Finance Industry-year Shareholding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CEO equity-based pay fraction -0.053** -0.063 -0.057** -0.059***
(0.022) (0.045) (0.023) (0.022)
CEO equity-based pay/salary ratio -0.004*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO shareholding fraction -0.127 -0.085
(0.177) (0.174)
Managers’ characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by firm-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year-fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
Worker characteristics by
industry-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, state-, and year-
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorp-state-year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.402 0.404 0.372 0.369 0.473 0.472 0.307 0.305
Observations 3,109 3,109 2,470 2,470 5,579 5,579 5,579 5,579
Number of firms 368 368 286 286 651 651 651 651
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Equity based pay fraction is defined as the fraction of stock award and stock option in the executive total
compensation. Equity/salary ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of
salary. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus), CEO-chair
duality, externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, sales per
employee, total assets, leverage ratio, capital expenditure divided by total assets, and firm’s age. Worker
characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, experience, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban
residence, and marital status, all calculated as proportions at the 2-SIC digit-year level. Robust standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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A.5 Robustness tests using the individual-level sample: sam-
ple selection bias and composition changes by offshoring
(corresp. Section 1.3.3.3)
Data and Variables
Table 1.9 summarizes the distributions of workers, firms and executives across
major sectors in the individual-level sample, and Table 1.10 shows summary statistics
of all variables. Since we calculated the executive-, firm-, and industry-level variables
at the 2-digit SIC level, the discrepancies between the sectoral distributions of workers
and firm/executive do not affect matching and measurements. My sample contains
54 industries by 2-digit SIC.
Table A.3. Distributions of workers, firms and executives across major industries
(%), the individual-level sample
Sector (1-digit SIC, division) Workers Firms Executives
Mining and Construction 3.62 3.77 2.69
Manufacturing 1: Food, Textile, Chemicals, etc. 8.86 13.16 15.04
Manufacturing 2: Rubber, Machinery, Electronics, etc. 12.09 23.37 18.09
Transportation, Communications, Electric, etc. 10.8 12.3 21.19
Wholesale Trade & Retail Trade 25.35 13.57 8.51
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 9.65 12.24 25.91
Services 1: Hotel, Personal Business, Motion Picture, etc. 8.52 15.34 5.07
Services 2: Health, Legal, Education, Social, etc. 21.12 5.89 3.51
In the analyses using the individual-level sample, the dependent variable is the
log(hourly wage), where the hourly wage includes annual wage and salary income1 plus
employer’s contribution for health insurance, and divided by total working hours and
deflated by CPI to 2010 dollar values. It is therefore a measurement of a worker’s
total pay, keeping in line with the wage measure in the firm-level sample. (Table
1.11 column (3) and (4) show that the estimation results are similar when excluding
employer’s contribution for health insurance from the measurement of the dependent
variable.)
1The data of extremely high incomes in CPS are subjected to topcoding procedures and therefore
bias downward for confidentiality reason. To deal with the problem, we multiply top-coded incomes
in the period 1992-1995 by 1.75, following the method of Philippon & Reshef (2012).
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Equity Fraction, Equity Ratio, and other manager and firm characteristics are
defined in the same ways as in the firm-level sample, but calculated at the industry-
year level. We first calculate them for each firm-year, and then take the weighted
averages of each at the 2-digit SIC level for each industry-year. We use the share
of each firm in the total employees in each industry-year as the weight of each firm
and each executive. So the basic unit of my explanatory variables are a ratio in
an industry-year. Individual workers are then matched with the executive and firm
variables by industry-year.
As in the previous firm-level analyses, we also include industry-, year-, and state-
year-fixed effects, and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on the Compustat
dataset. Additionally, we control for occupation-fixed effects which is not feasible





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We fit a series of cross-section regressions in the worker-firm-executive matched
sample as follows:
log(wijst) = α + βXjt + γMjt + δIjt + φVist + µFijst + εijst, (A.1)
where w is the hourly total wage, so log(wijst) is the log wage of individual i in industry
j in state s at time t. Xjt denotes CEO compensation structure measures of including
equity-based pay, stocks and options, performance pay, non-equity performance pay.
Mjt includes other manager characteristics and three variables of managerial control-
ling power. Ijt includes firm characteristics, and Vist includes workers’ characteristics
including occupation. Fjst are industry-, year- and state-year-fixed effects, and HHI
by industry and Emp-HHI by state. The robust standard errors are clustered at the
industry level. The estimations of β is of particular interest in the following analyses.
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Table A.5. Effects of Equity-Based Pay on Wages, Individual-Level Sample
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wage)
with health contrib. without health contrib.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO equity fraction by industry-year -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.011) (0.01)
CEO equity ratio by industry-year -0.000391** -0.000403**
(0.000169) (0.000179 )
Manager characteristics by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-, industry- and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.502 0.502
Clustered-robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Column (1) and (2): worker’s wage with employers’ contribution for health insurance.
Column (3) and (4): worker’s wage without employers’ contribution for health insurance. Equity
fraction is defined as the fraction of stock award and stock option in the executive total
compensation. Equity ratio is defined as stock awards plus stock options divided by salary.
Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus),
CEO-chair duality, CEO’s relative shareholdings against all other 5% institutional blockholders,
externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender, non-CEO’s relative shareholdings against all other 5%
institutional blockholders. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, log value of sales
per employee, log value of asset per employee, leverage ratio, numbers of employees, capital
expenditure, return on asset, which are all calculated at the 2-SIC digit industry-year level.
Worker characteristics include: gender, race, age, education, potential experience and its square
term, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban residence, and marital status. Robust standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the industry level.
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Table A.6. Effects of Four Compensation Components on Wages, Individual-Level
Sample
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CEO stock award fraction -0.047**
(0.018)
CEO stock option fraction -0.019*
(0.01)
CEO performance pay -0.028**
fraction (0.012)
CEO non-equity perf. pay 0.03*
fraction (0.018)
CEO stocks award ratio -0.000892***
(0.000322)
CEO stock options ratio -0.000241
(0.000159)
CEO performance pay -0.000368**
ratio (0.000165)




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI by industry-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics by
industry-year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation-, industry- and
year-fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203 564,203
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. Performance pay fraction is defined as the fraction of bonus + long-term incentive pay + equity-based pay,
till 2005; CEO’s non-equity incentive pay + equity-based pay, since 2006, in the executive total compensation. Stock
award and stock option fractions are defined as the value of stock award and stock option divided by the value of the
executive total compensation. Stock award/salary ratio and stock option/salary ratio are defined as the value of
stock award and stock option divided by the value of salary. Non-equity performance pay fraction is defined as the
fraction of bonus + long-term incentive pay till 2005, non-equity incentive pay since 2006, in the executive total
compensation. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations (salary + bonus),
CEO-chair duality, CEO’s relative shareholdings against all other 5% institutional blockholders, externally-hired
CEO, and CEO’s non-equity performance pay ratio, non-CEO’s gender, non-CEO’s relative shareholdings against all
other 5% institutional blockholders. Manager characteristics include: gender, total amount of current compensations
(salary + bonus), CEO-chair duality, CEO’s relative shareholdings against all other 5% institutional blockholders,
externally-hired CEO, non-CEO’s gender, non-CEO’s relative shareholdings against all other 5% institutional
blockholders. Firm characteristics includes: foreign activity dummy, log value of sales per employee, log value of
asset per employee, leverage ratio, numbers of employees, capital expenditure, return on asset, which are all
calculated at the 2-SIC digit industry-year level. Worker characteristics include: gender, race, age, education,
potential experience and its square term, union coverage, full/part-time status, urban residence, and marital status.





B.1 Expanded OLS results
Table B.1. Effects of Equity-Based Pay on Investment Herding (Non-Financial
Firms): Comparing Three Targets
Outcome Variable: Firm’s Investment Change (∆IF )
Industry-Median Industry-Average Industry-Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry investment change (∆IInd) 1.008*** 0.983*** 0.001 0.001 0.061 0.069
(0.365) (0.364) (0.002) (0.002) (0.135) (0.134)
CEO equity-based pay ratio × ∆IInd 0.032** 0.000* 0.006
(0.018) (0.000) (0.007)
CEO stock award ratio × ∆IInd -0.039 -0.000 0.020
(0.045) (0.000) (0.014)
CEO stock option ratio × ∆IInd 0.045** 0.000** 0.001*
(0.019) (0.000) (0.008)
CEO equity-based pay ratio -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO stock award ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
CEO stock option ratio -0.000** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager characteristics and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆IFt−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation-state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.308 0.308 0.303 0.303 0.305 0.305
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520 29,261 29,261
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,640 2,640
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Investment changes are measured by the difference
between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the last period. In
Column (1) & (2), the industry investment change is industry-median investment change calculated excluding the
focal firm. In Column (3) & (4), the industry investment change is industry-average investment change calculated
excluding the focal firm. In Column (5) & (6), the industry investment change is industry-leader investment change,
which is defined as the average investment changes of top tercile of firms (by sales share) in the industry. These
top-tercile firms are excluded from regressions in Column (5) & (6). Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level.
Equity based pay ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. Stock
award and stock option ratios are defined as the values of stock award and stock option divided by the value of
salary. Manager characteristics include: CEO-chair duality and externally hired CEO. Firm characteristics include:
tangible asset rate, the numbers of one-year-ahead EPS forecasts, firm’s age, the return on firm’s assets last year,
and the number of employees. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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B.2 Evidence on Causality, IV Estimation (LIML Estimator)
Table B.2. Evidence on Causality, IV Estimation (LIML Estimator)
Treatment range 750- 850- 950- 1050- 1150-
($Salary, thousand dollars) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Stage Endogenous variable 1: CEO equity ratio
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 20.431 29.341 17.662 9.983 4.26
p-value of Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 4.34e-13 1.16e-18 2.37e-11 1.53e-06 0.00521
Endogenous variable 2: CEO equity ratio × ∆IInd
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 6.970 6.481 5.878 5.534 4.859
p-value of Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 0.00011 0.00023 0.00054 0.00087 0.00225
Second Stage Dependent variable: Firm’s investment change (∆IF )
CEO equity ratio × ∆IInd -0.249** -0.287** -0.323** -.311** -0.342**
(0.115) (0.126) (0.136) (0.136) (0.152)
∆IInd 2.105*** 2.275*** 2.426*** 2.373*** 2.487***
(0.616) (0.645) (0.692) (0.686) (0.762)
CEO equity ratio -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 33.431 39.8 25.968 16.63 8.585
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 15.336 22.346 13.362 7.449 3.165
Controlling Variables
Manager characteristics × ∆IInd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HHI × ∆IInd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics × ∆IInd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆IFt−1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of employees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Return of assets last year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry- and year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation state-year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520 32,520
Number of firms 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,689
Robust S.E. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered at firms.
Notes. The sample includes the firms in CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, matching with the CEO
compensation data from Execucomp database, covers the period from 1992 to 2016, and excludes firms in financial
and utilities industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4949-4999). Firm’s investment changes (∆IF ) are measured by
the difference between the investment ratio (total capital expenditures divided by assets) of this period and of the
last period. Industry-median investment change (∆IInd) is measured by the median investment change in the
industry excluding the focal firm. Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC level. CEO Equity based-pay ratio is defined
as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the value of salary. From Column (1) to (5), the treatment
ranges are 750 and above, 850 and above, 950 and above, 1050 and above, and 1150 and above, in thousand dollars.
Manager characteristics include: CEO-chair duality and externally-hired CEO. Firm characteristics includes:
tangible asset ratio, analyst forecast coverage, firm’s age. All controlling variables are the same as in OLS analyses
except the firm-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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B.3 Tests using two deviation indices
Table B.3. Effects on Deviation Indices (Non-Financial Firms)
Dependent Variable: Carpenter (2000) Tang, et al. (2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO equity pay ratio 0.008* -0.005
(0.005) (0.007)
CEO stock award ratio 0.000 0.019**
(0.009) (0.009)
CEO stock option ratio 0.005 -0.013*
(0.003) (0.007)
Tangible asset rate 0.000 -0.000 -0.145*** -0.144***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028)
Analyst forecast coverage -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.016 -0.017
(0.044) (0.044) (0.019) (0.019)
HHI 0.013 0.013 -0.067*** -0.066***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020)
CEO-chair duality & ex-
ternal CEO
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-, industry-, and
year-fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation-state-year-
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.100 0.060 0.061
Observations 25,742 25,742 30,059 30,059
Number of firms 2,362 2,362 2,599 2,599
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. In Column (1) & (2), the outcome variable is the strategic deviation index of Carpenter (2000), which is
computed by first calculating six indicators: advertising intensity (advertising expense / sales), plant and equipment
upgrades (net plant and equipment / gross plant and equipment), nonproduction overhead (SGA expenses /sales),
inventory levels (inventory / sales), financial leverage (debt / equity), and international concern (foreign sales / total
sales). Second, calculate the three-year standard deviation of each indicator for each firm. Third, sum up these
indicators to form the strategic deviation index. In Column (3) & (4), the outcome variable is the strategic
deviation index of Tang, et al. (2011) , which is computed by first calculating four indicators: capital intensity
(fixed assets / number of employees), plant and equipment upgrades (net plant and equipment / gross plant and
equipment), overhead efficiency (selling, general, and administrative expense / sales), and financial leverage (total
debt / equity). Second, calculate the standard deviations of each indicator for each firm, and then obtain the
absolute value of them. Third, average these indicators to form the strategic deviation index. Industry is defined at
the 3-digit SIC level. Equity based pay ratio is defined as the value of stock award plus stock option divided by the
value of salary. Stock award and stock option ratios are defined as the values of stock award and stock option
divided by the value of salary. Manager characteristics include: gender, shareholding percentage of the firm’s stocks,
externally hired CEO, and CEO-chair duality. Firm characteristics include log value of sales and log value of asset.
In regressions, most explanatory and controlling variables are standardized except two binary variables, CEO-chair
duality and external CEO. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Krüger, P. (2015): “Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth,” Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, 115(2), 304-329.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999): “Corporate own-
ership around the world,” The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Lazonick, W. (2014): “Profits without prosperity,” Harvard Business Review,
92(9), 46-55.
Leary, M. T., & Roberts, M. R. (2014): “Do peer firms affect corporate financial
policy?,” The Journal of Finance, 69(1), 139-178.
Leonardi, M. (2007): “Firm heterogeneity in capital–labour ratios and wage in-
equality,” The Economic Journal, 117(518), 375-398.
Lin, K. H., & Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (2013): “Financialization and US income
inequality, 1970–2008,” American Journal of Sociology, 118(5), 1284-1329.
Lins, K. V., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2017): “Social capital, trust, and
firm performance: The value of corporate social responsibility during the financial
crisis,” The Journal of Finance, 72(4), 1785-1824.
Magill, M., Quinzii, M., & Rochet, J. C. (2015): “A theory of the stakeholder
corporation,” Econometrica, 83(5), 1685-1725.
Matsusaka, J. G., Ozbas, O., & Yi, I. (2019): “Opportunistic proposals by
union shareholders,” The Review of Financial Studies, 32(8), 3215-3265.
115
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2000): “Corporate social responsibility and finan-
cial performance: correlation or misspecification?,” Strategic Management Journal,
21(5), 603-609.
Melitz, M. J., & Redding, S. J. (2014): “Heterogeneous firms and trade,” in
Handbook of international economics (Vol. 4, pp. 1-54): Elsevier.
Murphy, K. J. (2013): “Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We
Got There,” Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2: 211-356.
Ordover, J. A., & Shapiro, C. (1984): “Advances in supervision technology and
economic welfare: a general equilibrium analysis,” Journal of Public Economics,
25(3), 371-389.
Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. F. (2005): “Managers, workers, and corporate control,”
The Journal of Finance, 60(2), 841-868.
Pathan, S. (2009): “Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking,” Journal of
Banking & Finance, 33(7), 1340-1350.
Perry, T., & Zenner, M. (2001): “Pay for performance? Government regulation
and the structure of compensation contracts,” Journal of Financial Economics,
62(3), 453-488.
Philippon, T., & Reshef, A. (2012): “Wages and human capital in the US finance
industry: 1909-2006,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1551-1609.
Piketty, T., & E. Saez. (2003): “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
1998,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 2003: 1-39.
Raith, M. (2003): “Competition, risk, and managerial incentives,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 93(4), 1425-1436.
116
Renneboog, L., & Szilagyi, P. G. (2011): “The role of shareholder proposals in
corporate governance,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(1), 167-188.
Rifkin, J., & Barber, R. (1978): The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics
and Power in the 1980’s. Beacon Press.
Rose, N. L., & Wolfram, C. (2002): “Regulating executive pay: Using the
tax code to influence chief executive officer compensation,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 20(S2), S138-S175.
Scharfstein, D. (1988): “Product-market competition and managerial slack,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 19(1), 147-155.
Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1990): “Herd behavior and investment,”
American Economic Review, 80(3), 465-479.
Schmidt, K. M. (1997): “Managerial incentives and product market competition,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 64(2), 191-213.
Scopp, T. S. (2003): “The relationship between the 1990 census and census 2000
industry and occupation classification systems,” Technical Paper, No. 65. Wash-
ington, DC: US Census Bureau.
Shiller, R. J. (2015): Irrational exuberance. Princeton university press.
Shin, T. (2014): “Explaining pay disparities between top executives and nonex-
ecutive employees: A relative bargaining power approach,” Social Forces, 92(4),
1339-1372.
Shleifer, A., & Lawrence S. (1988): “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,” in
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences., edited by Alan J. Auerbach, pp.
33-56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
117
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997): “A survey of corporate governance,” The
Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Skott, P., & Guy, F. (2007): “A model of power-biased technological change,”
Economics Letters, 95(1), 124-131.
Skott, P., & Guy, F. (2013): “Power, luck and ideology in a model of executive
pay,” Working Paper (No. 2013-01). Abbreviated version published in Review of
Radical Political Economics, 2013, 45(3), pp. 323-332. (a more detailed version:
Skott, P., & Guy, F. (2013): “Power, luck and ideology in a model of executive
pay,” UMASS Department of Economics Working Paper.)
Spyrou, S. (2013): “Herding in financial markets: a review of the literature,” Review
of Behavioral Finance, 5(2), 175-194.
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (2003): Introduction to Econometrics. Boston:
Addison Wesley.
Stout, L. A. (2012): The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first
harms investors, corporations, and the public. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G. (2011): “Dominant CEO, deviant
strategy, and extreme performance: The moderating role of a powerful board,”
Journal of Management Studies, 48(7), 1479-1503.
Tirole, J. (1986): “Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in orga-
nizations,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2(2), 181-214.
Tirole, J. (2001), “Corporate Governance,” Econometrica, 69: 1-35.
Von Arx, U., & Ziegler, A. (2014): “The effect of corporate social responsibil-
ity on stock performance: New evidence for the USA and Europe,” Quantitative
Finance, 14(6), 977-991.
118
Webber, D. (2018): The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best
Weapon. Harvard University Press.
Williams, C. A. (2018): “Corporate social responsibility and corporate gover-
nance,” in Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance. (Jeffrey N. Gordon
and Wolf-Georg Ringe, Eds.)
Wright, P., & Ferris, S. P. (1997): “Agency conflict and corporate strategy: The
effect of divestment on corporate value,” Strategic Management Journal, 18(1), 77-
83.
Young, K. L. (2012): “Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination
of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,”
Review of International Political Economy, 19(4), 663-688.
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y.
(2008): “Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-
principal perspective,” Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196-220.
119
